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Fear

Breaking Down the Psychological Barriers to Peace

The "enemy image" and negotiations with North Korea.

For the first time in more than a year, the world has reason to hope that the crisis on the Korean peninsula might not end violently. President Trump and North Korean ruler Kim Jong-un have expressed their desire to talk, postponing — at least for now — the war nobody wants.

People would be wise not to wager much on lasting peace, however. In addition to the substantial policy disagreements between the two countries, these volatile leaders have to overcome long-standing, deep-seated mistrust and fear. The United States and North Korea view each other through the prism of the “enemy image,” which has depressingly predictable effects on thought and action. This image, sometimes referred to as the “inherent bad faith model,” shapes the way actors interpret new information and serves as a serious obstacle to any lasting agreement. The negotiations are beset by pathological internal forces, in other words, which will prevent progress unless they are recognized and minimized.

The enemy image creates a consistent pattern of misperception, which is likely to play out if and when the summit occurs. Most obviously, both sides are very likely to believe nothing the other says. Both will cite recent historical experience regarding the collapse of earlier negotiations — an event for which blame is shared equally — but the root of the mutual suspicion will be the pathological images they hold. Diplomatic overtures to enemies are not only pointless but dangerous, so the thinking goes, since they have no intention of following through on their commitments. They will hide their hostility and perfidy, but only briefly, as they seek to lull us into a false sense of security.

The inherent bad faith model conditions its victims to believe that the other side only responds to strength and power (or, as it is always stated, our enemy du jour “only understands the language of force”). One of the iron rules about perception in international politics is that the other is a “realist.” While we realize that our side has principles and peaceful aspirations, we are pretty sure that they are motivated primarily by the pursuit of their interests. Cooperative approaches are not only a waste of time but counterproductive, since they signal weakness to realist enemy actors. Forceful measures have a far greater chance of success.

We always perceive our enemies to be superior strategists. While our leaders rarely think beyond the present crisis, theirs combine wisdom with cunning and patience. Rivals always seem culturally disposed to take “the long view”; unlike us, enemies have the gift of patience. To use the common (rather idiotic) metaphor, they play chess while we respond with checkers. Enemies are also better at implementing their nefarious plans: While we know our actions are often ad-hoc and reactive, we believe they are proceeding according to a secret master plan, and assume that their actions produce the intended result. This is a natural perception, since people are aware of their own internal deliberations and divisions but see only the outcomes of decisions made elsewhere, which makes other actors seem unified and strategic. They think the same of us.

These considerations are only the tip of the pathological enemy-image iceberg. This blog will dig into this and many other issues in political psychology, many of which seem to have taken on greater urgency in the Trump years. It will explore the fear, biases, emotions, hidden motivations, pathologies and misperceptions that drive political behavior, from the voting booth to the stateroom. Many of the core beliefs that inspire America’s foreign and domestic policies rest on surprisingly thin foundations. Where do our dubious — and occasionally counterproductive — beliefs come from? Why are they held so deeply, even when they are built on thin evidentiary ice? And what can be done to correct them?

No settlement between the United States and North Korea is possible unless the substantial psychological barriers to peace are overcome. If the two leaders could recognize the root of those barriers, the chances of their success — and ours — would rise dramatically.

References

For more, see the classic text on misperception: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

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More from Christopher J. Fettweis Ph.D.
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