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Key points
- Scientists and philosophers often argue that we as humans do not have free will.
- The outcome of the famous Libet experiment has been reinterpreted: the "readiness potential" of the brain does not determine our choices.
- We desire many things (first-order willing) but can self-regulate ourselves to want what we actually want (second-order willing).
- Choices are not causally determined by upbringing and circumstances. They are a product of our reflection on upbringing and circumstances.
Over the last few decades, scientists and philosophers have tried to persuade the public that we as humans do not make free choices. We might subjectively experience our decisions as consciously willed, they argue, but this feeling is illusory.
The essential argument is that we are unaware of causes that underlie our behaviour and that we cannot consciously control. Decisions are made by unconscious motivations without any input from our conscious self. This interpretation of the human condition is perhaps best illustrated by the metaphor of humans as marionettes (Gray, 2015).
Forty years ago, Benjamin Libet and coworkers (1983) showed that a brain signal named "readiness potential", which was tied to a choice of whether or not to press a button, starts a second before a participant consciously experiences her intention to act. Following from this, it is argued, there is no free will when we chose an action.
In other words, the readiness potential drives the decision to act before we are aware of an intention. I want chocolate ice cream instead of vanilla ice cream, but the decision has been made by the brain seconds before I am aware of it.
In a previous Psychology Today blog I had argued that, based on our own Libet-type studies, the readiness potential makes us more ready (as the name actually implies) to press the button but it does not determine it (Jo et al., 2013). We have the ability to reflect upon the urges and motivations that may occur, say, to press the button or not, to order vanilla or chocolate ice cream, to go to a party, or study for exams.
A conceptual distinction between first-order and second-order willing may be helpful here. While we desire many things (first-order willing), through a meta-level of desire (the desire to desire) we can self-regulate what we actually want to do (second-order willing). There is a reflection stage between the stimulus (an upcoming urge) and the response which creates an internal locus of control. In this way, we are more or less free to decide upon the manifold motivations at the moment of deciding what to do.
Of course, environmental constraints such as living in a hunger-stricken war zone reduce the degrees of personal freedom. Similarly, a heroin addict who is in urgent need of the next shot can only be considered minimally free. He may very well not be able to abstain from the drug when it is available. I am talking about relative free will given the situational context, genetic predispositions, and upbringing. Within these constraints, I have the propensity to decide freely.
We all remember when we regretted decisions we made despite knowing better. We might have missed an opportunity because an unconscious desire lead us astray at a given moment (first-order willing) and we did not react appropriately. But despite some of our negative habits, we can still gradually change what we actually want across time (second-order willing).
Insight into what we want to do (behaviour) or who we would like to be (personality) can lead to gradual adaptations through deliberate (free) choices in life. Personality growth is reflected by the fact that on average individuals become less neurotic, more conscientious, and agreeable as they get older—i.e. we become more relaxed, mindful, and nicer (Staudinger & Kunzmann, 2005).
This is what the aphorism attributed to David Bowie expresses: “I think aging is an extraordinary process where you become the person you always should have been.” These positive changes over the life span are due to second-order willing (what we would like to be) which is causally effective in shaping our first-order will (the motivations that arise at the present moment). Over the course of time, we learn that we can self-regulate how to want what we actually want.
This is what the neuroscientist Peter Ulric Tse (2013) argues for. According to him, we set criteria for upcoming events in advance. In that sense, we are free to behave differently in the future.
So, if I perceive a suboptimal outcome of my behavior now because I decided impulsively, the next time I am confronted with a similar decision, I adjust my choice and behave differently. The positive outcome reinforces more optimal future decision-making.
In this sense, through future-oriented self-regulation, I am free to will what I want. Short-term future self-regulation can happen in the time range of seconds when I realize a mistake and immediately correct it (if it is still possible). Self-regulation might take decades when we reinterpret a past event in memory and change our attitude.
The idea of free will evolves from this conceptualization of self-regulation, a form of inner control of what is happening to us. When we make choices, they are our choices now, not a mere product of unconscious causes shaped by the past. My choices are not causally determined by upbringing and circumstances. They are the product of the reflection concerning my upbringing and circumstances. Self-regulation means that at any given moment, we can try to intervene between possible causes and effects and thus becomes a self-determined free agent.
References
Gray, J. (2015). The soul of the marionette: A short inquiry into human freedom. London: Penguin Books.
Jo, H. G., Hinterberger, T., Wittmann, M., Borghardt, T. L., & Schmidt, S. (2013). Spontaneous EEG fluctuations determine the readiness potential: is preconscious brain activation a preparation process to move? Experimental Brain Research, 231(4), 495–500.
Libet B., Gleason C. A., Wright E. W., Pearl D. K. (1983) Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106(3), 623–642.
Staudinger, U. M., & Kunzmann, U. (2005). Positive adult personality development: Adjustment and/or growth? European Psychologist, 10(4), 320–329.
Tse, P.U. (2013). The neural basis of free will. Criterial causation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
