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In August 2015, three young American men (Anthony Sadler, Spencer Stone, and Alek Skarlatos) were on a crowded train heading from Paris to Amsterdam when they encountered a heavily armed terrorist intent on committing an act of unspeakable carnage. With little regard for their personal safety, they rushed the terrorist and subdued him, undoubtedly saving the lives of a great many people. They have been awarded the Legion of Honor by the President of France and celebrated as heroes by leaders around the world, including President Obama.
No one disputes that these men deserve to be called “heroes.”
We love our heroes, especially courageous ones who risk their lives. Legends extolling the valor of warriors from days past are a staple of the folklore in most human societies: Old Testament stories such as David slaying Goliath; the sagas of Beowulf and Odysseus; even the popularity of modern comic book superheroes testifies to the durability of our heroes.
Holidays such as Memorial Day and Veteran’s Day in the United States exist to elevate the status of heroes who have made the ultimate sacrifice for the good of the group, and to prevent such sacrifices from ever being forgotten or overlooked.
So, we hold heroes in such high esteem because they act in a noble and virtuous manner, setting aside any thoughts of their own well being for the good of others.
Or do they?
Are Heroes Actually "Selfish?"
Evolutionary psychologists believe that even apparently selfless impulses such as heroism must provide some adaptive advantage for individuals. Otherwise, the genes of individuals with heroic tendencies would disappear from the population as they sacrifice their lives for others. There are several theories that attempt to explain such behavior.
Inclusive fitness (also known as kin selection) convincingly explains why we sacrifice for family members, but self-sacrificial acts performed for close kin are usually not described in everyday life as being “heroic” or even as “altruistic.” We admire the parent who rushes into a burning building or dives into an icy river to save one of his or her children, but we understand the intense emotions driving such behavior and we do not usually bestow the mantle of “hero” on these individuals.
Reciprocal altruism helps us understand individuals who sacrifice for the benefit of unrelated others, expecting that they will reap the benefits of returned favors from the people who “owe” them. However, anyone who helps others and expects payback will not be thought of as a hero, and in spectacular life-saving acts of heroism it is clear that no adequate payback could really be possible anyway, so this explanation for heroic behavior also seems to be a non-starter.
Thus, we must turn to other theories for insight into heroic behavior that benefits people who do not share our genes and who cannot pay us back.
Costly Signaling
The best explanation may lie in something called Costly Signaling Theory (CST). CST suggests that conspicuous self-sacrificial heroism may be a way for individuals to advertise desirable personal traits. This might increase the likelihood that they will be chosen as a mate or an ally and it might also position them for access to future status and resources, even from individuals who were not direct beneficiaries of the heroic act. For a costly signal to be effective, it must honestly convey valuable information about the individual sending the signal, and it must be impossible to fake.
I am not suggesting that heroes consciously sit down and calculate all of the great stuff that will come their way if they survive the heroic action (e.g., “Nothing impresses the girls like a Legion of Honor Medal!”); rather, I am suggesting that such impulses have been selected for because heroic behavior has provided advantages for men throughout human history.
If self-sacrificial altruistic behavior is in fact a “guy thing,” it should be most likely to occur when men show off and compete directly with each other for status (and ultimately for mating opportunities) by conspicuously displaying courage and strength. After all, if a guy can take such risks and survive them, he is signaling to others that he has special qualities.
Research on Male Altruistic Behavior
Conveniently, there is data to confirm that males are more likely to display altruism in the presence of an attractive member of the opposite sex; the same does not hold true for females. (Farrelly, Lazarus and Roberts, 2007; Iredale, van Vugt and Dunbar, 2008). I myself have conducted several laboratory studies demonstrating that self-sacrificial altruistic male behavior is most likely to occur when females are present and when another male is also present (McAndrew, 2012a, 2012b).
This idea has been around for quite some time, as illustrated by a quote from the Sioux warrior “Rain in the Face.” In describing the effect that the presence of women in a war party has on male warriors, he said: “When there is a woman in the charge, it causes the warriors to vie with one another in displaying their valor.” (Philbrick, 2010, p. 179)
A team of European psychologists explored the proposition that war provides an arena for men (but not for women) to strut their heroic stuff as a way of impressing both their male rivals and females who might be potential mates.
In their first study, they found that 464 American men who had won the Medal of Honor during World War II eventually had more children than other U.S. service men who had not been so heroically distinguished.
This is consistent with the idea that heroism gets rewarded with greater reproductive success.
In a second study, 92 women rated the sexual attractiveness of men who had behaved heroically in war as being higher than that of soldiers who had served but not been identified as heroes. Tellingly, women did not show this increased attraction toward men who had behaved heroically in sports or business situations. A third study revealed that behaving heroically in war does not increase the attractiveness of female war heroes to men. In summary, heroism in time of war is sexier than any other kind of heroism, but only for men. (Rusch, Leunissen, & van Vugt, 2015).
I am aware that heroism need not take the form of risky, death-defying behavior. We rightfully call people heroes when they take unpopular political stands for a greater good or when they take personal risks to improve the lives of others. The names of individuals like Mother Theresa, Nelson Mandela, and Rosa Parks easily come to mind when we think about heroism in this light. However, in this essay, I wished to focus on the type of physically risky heroic bravery that we see in situations like the terrorist-on-the-train and explore the reasons why such behavior is something that is expected more from men than from women.
Perhaps heroes have a more selfish motive for going off to war than even they themselves know?
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