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What to Do About ISIS?
Fighting the war of ideas is as important as dropping bombs.
Posted November 25, 2015
What to do about ISIS?
ISIS is more than violence, it is a brand name. We need to fight the brand in a war of ideas that is just as important as the war on the ground in Syria and Iraq. In this paper I suggest a diplomatic initiative to describe the world we want to emerge in Syria and Iraq. I begin with assessment of the current situation, then describe a view of the future that the U.S. could offer for discussion, and end with some estimates of the effects of this intervention.
The roots of violence in Syria and Iraq
As described by McCauley and Moskalenko, a major support for ISIS is that Sunni of Iraq and Syria see ISIS as their only effective defense against domination and humiliation by Shi’a (1). ISIS protection of Sunni is currently welded together with an extremist form of Islam that many Sunni would rather do without (2). To undermine Sunni support for ISIS, the U.S. must show Sunni in Syria and Iraq a path to security from Shi’a humiliation that does not depend on ISIS (3).
Similar issues of security and status exist for other violent actors in Iraq and Syria. Kurds are seeking security from humiliation by Arabs and Turks. Alawites and Christians seek security from revenge and humiliation by the Sunni majority they previously dominated. Russians seek Mediterranean port and airbase facilities and the survival of their ally Bashar al-Assad. Turks want good relations with the Sunni majority in Syria and no Kurdish state on their border. Iran wants to extend its influence while protecting Shi’a. In addition there are Sunni tribes in both Syria and Iraq that have been both perpetrators and as victims of violence.
My conclusion is that the U.S. needs a diplomatic initiative that can offer at least a degree of security and status to all the major actors. This initiative would describe the world the U.S. would like to see emerge from the current violence in Iraq and Syria, and include a statement of willingness to talk with anyone and everyone about how to reach this world or something like it.
The U.S. initiative: A future for Syria and Iraq
The U.S. goal is recognition and construction of political units providing security and status for the groups identified below. Security and status will be assured to the extent that each unit has its own police and court system and controls its own water and oil resources. The units may initially be thought of as states in a federal government that negotiates water and oil disputes, but other descriptions of the units are possible (provinces, departments, governorates). The U.S. will talk with any group or interest about how to get to these or similar units. There are no pre-conditions for this discussion, including Sykes-Picot lines of 1916; all borders and boundaries must be negotiated.
1. IS territory becomes a state of Sunni who want ISIS governance. U.S. will cease attacks on ISIS and cease opposing foreign volunteers for ISIS, including volunteers from the U.S.
2. Tribal state for Sunni who do not want ISIS governance
3. Alawite state on the Mediterranean north of Lebanon
4. Kurdish state around Erbil
5. Shi’a state around Baghdad
6. Druze state next Jordan
7. Damascus Federal District with police but no military
8. Christians who wish to emigrate will be accepted as immigrants in Europe and U.S.
Likely reactions to the U.S. initiative (an area specialist would do better here than a social psychologist!)
ISIS will oppose the initiative because it threatens ISIS’s claims to represent an international caliphate. But if ISIS loses more territory it may become ready to negotiate to save the caliphate it has remaining. At a minimum the initiative will raise conflict inside ISIS between power pragmatists (localists) and international lslamist radicals (globalists).
Sunni who do and do not want ISIS will be put in conflict. The Awakening showed the potential power of this conflict.
Tehran will likely oppose the U.S. initiative because any movement toward a peaceful solution in the area would reduce Iran’s influence in Iraq and Syria.
Some Baghdad Shi’a may welcome the initiative as a way to reduce threat from ISIS, even at the cost of more self-determination for Sunni areas of the old Iraq. Others in Baghdad will be against any initiative that does not continue their revenge against the Sunni who dominated Iraqi Shi’a for so long.
Moscow should welcome saving Bashar and de facto Western recognition for their Mediterranean air and sea bases. Maybe even welcome a division of territorial influence that can limit potential conflict between Russian and NATO armed forces.
Israel will be satisfied with continued dismemberment of two strong states of Syria and Iraq.
Kurds will be pleased at recognition of their statelet.
Druze will be pleased at the prospect of recognition and some self-governance.
Christians, who are too few for effective self-defense, will be glad for an escape hatch to immigration.
U.S. will get credit in the Muslim world for seeking peace without Western domination or further introduction of Western troops.
Arab oil countries will likely oppose the initiative because it does not promise to crush ISIS or Shi’a power.
Turkey will hate further recognition of current de-facto Kurdish territory.
U.S. sympathizers with ISIS will more likely go to Syria than attack in the U.S.
Refugees from Syria are likely to favor an initiative that might permit some to return.
On balance, the initiative should be PR positive for the U.S. and help bring conflict into Sunni support for ISIS. It should shake up all sides by shifting the narrative from who is winning now to a conception of a future worth working for. Even opposition from Turkey, Iran, and the oil states should be tempered by a desire to avoid being seen putting self-interest above the welfare of millions who prefer peace. With this initiative the U.S. can seize the moral high ground that brings new friends and new opportunities.
References
(1) McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2015). Understanding the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and its appeal in the U.S. Pp. 109-113 in H. Cabayan & S. Canna (Eds.), Multi-method assessment of ISIL. Washington, D.C.: A Strategic Multi-Layer (SMA) Periodic Publication.
(2) Moaveninov, A. (2015). ISIS Women and Enforcers in Syria Recount Collaboration, Anguish and Escape. New York Times, November 21. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/middleeast/isis-wives-and-enfor…
(3) Bolton, J. R. (2015). To Defeat ISIS, Create a Sunni State. New York Times, November 24. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/opinion/john-bolton-to-defeat-isis-cr…
(4) Gurcan, S. (2015). Is the Islamic State going global? Al Monitor, November 20. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/turkey-syria-isis-goi…
