

## 11 Against Interiority: Foucault's Struggle with Psychoanalysis

I had been mad enough to study reason.  
I was reasonable enough to study madness.

Michel Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*

Unreason becomes the reason of reason.

Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la folie*

And how comfortless is the thought that the sickness of  
the normal does not necessarily imply as its opposite the  
health of the sick.

Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia*

### I

In *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*,<sup>1</sup> Foucault claimed to have definitively refuted the basic claims of psychoanalysis. However, a year after its publication, when a young acquaintance asked him to recommend a form of therapy, Foucault gave rather unexpected advice. Instead of suggesting something *avant garde*, like Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, he replied, "Freudian will be fine."<sup>2</sup> This incident – as well as a consideration of his oeuvre<sup>3</sup> – indicates the intensely conflicted and complex nature of Foucault's relation to analysis. Just as Moses haunted Freud "like an unlaidd ghost,"<sup>4</sup> so Foucault could never successfully exorcise the specter of Freud. He kept returning to Freud throughout his career. Indeed, the persistence of Foucault's comings and goings with respect to the Freud led Derrida to remark sardonically that he was engaged in an "interminable and inexhaustible" *fort-da* game with the founder of psychoanalysis.<sup>5</sup>

One source of Foucault's struggle with Freud is relatively straightforward: rivalry.<sup>6</sup> Whatever his antagonism towards psychoanalysis, the philosopher was honest enough with himself to admit the seeming boundlessness of Freud's creativity and the sheer magnitude of his achievement; and he was ambitious enough to try to make his mark by toppling one of the master thinkers of the twentieth century. If we just think of the topics Foucault tackled – the normal and the pathological, rationality and irrationality, the modern subject, the human sciences, sexuality and techniques of self-transformation – we can see that he was challenging the good doctor from Vienna on his own theoretical turf.

There is another, perhaps more profound, source for Foucault's difficulties with psychoanalysis, having to do with its very essence. Though it doesn't deny the importance of social reality, analysis confronts us with the formidable and often frightening task of turning inward and undertaking a prolonged exploration of our inner reality<sup>7</sup> in order to integrate our interior world into our everyday lives.<sup>8</sup> It must be admitted that there is something "unnatural" about the whole exercise, as it goes against the psyche's stubborn resolve to remain oriented towards the outside. (This is a key reason for the widespread hostility towards the field.) As Freud observes, "if someone tries to turn our awareness inward... our whole organization resists – just as, for example, the oesophagus and the urethra resist any attempt to reverse their normal direction of passage."<sup>9</sup>

The course of Foucault's early intellectual development moved from an avid interest in everything psychological to a radical *disavowal* of the significance of the psyche. In the years before the publication of *Madness and Civilization*, at the same time as he was pursuing his career as a philosopher, Foucault was thoroughly engrossed in exploring the realm of the psyche – the interior world. He was immersed in the study of the  $\Psi$ -disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, and psychoanalysis), both in their practical as well as theoretical dimensions. In fact, he seriously considered the possibility of a career in that domain.

At a particular point, however, because of a profound personal crisis, which we will consider below, Foucault abruptly turned away from his engagement with the inner world of the psyche. Until this

break, whatever criticisms he had of the psychological sciences – and they were significant – were made from within. He was, in short, a critical psychologist. Now, however, he condemned these sciences *in toto*. Central to this indictment was the charge that, historically and theoretically, these disciplines had constituted *Homo psychologicus* – that is, a split subject with an inner world – as their object.<sup>10</sup> Through a genealogical critique of psychology, which appeared in his first official publication, *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault hoped to nullify the challenge posed by the existence of an interior world and therewith the challenge of psychoanalysis. How did such a dramatic volte-face take place? What is its significance and why did Foucault try to cover it up?<sup>11</sup> These are the questions I would like to examine.

## II

As a student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) – “a kind of monastery for boy geniuses”<sup>12</sup> – Foucault was already dissatisfied with the official philosophy of the “old university” and despaired at the prospect of becoming a professional academic.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, he complied with the expectation placed on every *normalien* and rigorously studied philosophy, passing the *agregation* and receiving his *licence* in philosophy in 1948.<sup>14</sup>

Foucault’s dissatisfaction with academic philosophy – along with his own suffering – was a central factor leading to his immersion in the world of the psyche. While at the ENS, he attended monthly lectures where major figures in psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis discussed their field. He also sat in on case conferences at the famous Parisian psychiatric hospital, Sainte-Anne. With these pursuits, Foucault was “following a trajectory which led some of his contemporaries” at the ENS – most notably, Didier Anzieu and Jean Laplanche – into “a career in psychiatry or even psychoanalysis.”<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, the fact that Foucault “asked Lagache whether a medical training was a necessary prerequisite for a career in psychology” indicates that he, too, was considering a career someplace in the field.<sup>16</sup>

Foucault’s vigorous opposition to the idea of psychopathology, indeed to the very notion of diagnostic classification,<sup>17</sup> makes it difficult to discuss his own psychological difficulties. Nevertheless,

something must be said about Foucault's state of mind during his years at the ENS. Though there is some dispute over the details, Foucault's major biographers – who are all basically sympathetic to him – and his former classmates agree that he was an extremely tortured young man.<sup>18</sup> The consensus is that Foucault was severely depressed at that time, and there are reports of suicide attempts and instances of self-mutilation.<sup>19</sup> His intellectual aggressiveness and contentiousness seem to have estranged him from his fellow students, causing him to withdraw into solitude. Foucault's father, an autocratic and sadistic surgeon – the father-doctor incarnate – received word of his son's precarious condition and arranged a psychiatric consultation for him, which actually took place at Sainte-Anne. As Eribon points out, this was the first time Foucault had the psychiatric gaze directed at him<sup>20</sup> – an experience that most likely had momentous consequences for the development of his thinking.

While it is not completely clear how Foucault's homosexuality was connected with his psychological difficulties, it is almost certain it had a profound effect. Didier Anzieu, a fellow student who later became a famous psychoanalyst, and Jacqueline Verdeaux recall that he would “disappear from the ENS for days at a time,” embarking on “some lonely sexual expedition,” and would return in an “exhausted” and “very dejected” state.<sup>21</sup> Although the ENS had a relatively tolerant attitude regarding sexual matters, the society at large did not. Parisian culture in the 1950s – despite the city's renown for its blasé sexual urbanity – wasn't much different from what one found in most Western societies when it came to accepting homosexuality. As Eribon puts it, “Living with one's homosexuality was not easy in that period.”<sup>22</sup> You had to endure a clandestine and dangerous existence and were always at risk of being found out.

The consideration of certain aspects of Foucault's psychological and sexual life immediately raises the danger of *pathography*, a danger Eribon is eager to combat. Although he is frank about the severity of Foucault's psychological difficulties and acknowledges that his theoretical preoccupations grew out of them, Eribon has no tolerance for the critics who seek to reduce Foucault's work to the pathological aspects of his personality as a way of discrediting it. Eribon correctly argues that “it is possible to see how an intellectual project is born in an experience that should perhaps be described as primary,” and “how an intellectual adventure is created in the struggles of

individual and social life."<sup>23</sup> The pertinent question, however, is not whether such primary experiences exist, for in important work, they are almost always present.<sup>24</sup> It is rather whether one remains "stuck in" them or is able "to think them through" and "go beyond them" in order to create works that can stand on their own merits.<sup>25</sup>

Eribon believes that Foucault accomplished this with his critique of reason and madness. When Foucault had the psychiatric gaze directed at him, Eribon argues, he turned the tables on the psychiatrist and demanded, "Do you know who you are? Are you sure of your reason? Of your scientific concepts? Of your categories of perception?"<sup>26</sup>

This turning of the tables can be viewed psychologically and theoretically. Today, I believe, most analysts wouldn't see challenges from their patients – which question their competence, their mastery of the countertransference, their own psychopathology. indeed their very humanity – negatively. On the contrary, analysts would see such questioning as necessary for advancing the psychoanalytic process and promoting their patients' autonomy. At the same time, this turning of the tables doesn't eliminate the necessity of reflecting on and elucidating the patient's own point of view. Furthermore, just as, psychologically, Foucault never put the patient/madman's position into question, so, using radical-sounding anti-foundationalist rhetoric, he stubbornly refused to reflect on his own theoretical position throughout his career. That is, the repudiation of self-reflection on the psychological plane was paralleled on the theoretical plane.

After leaving the ENS and receiving his degree in philosophy, Foucault continued to pursue both the didactic and the clinical aspects of training in psychology. He studied with Lagache at the Sorbonne and received a *licence*, that is, an academic degree from the Institut de Psychologie de Paris in 1950. He also pursued clinical work in several settings and was awarded a *Diplôme de Psycho-Pathologie* in 1952, the equivalent of a practical license in mental health. Thus, by 1952, Foucault possessed all the credentials necessary to become either an academic psychologist or a practicing clinician. Though clinical psychology did not yet exist as an independent discipline, Foucault, through contacts with friends, was able to cobble together something resembling a clinical internship at Sainte-Anne and in the psychiatric unit of the prison at Fresnes.

As it has for numerous psychiatric residents and psychology interns having serious problems of their own, working in an acute

inpatient setting seems to have precipitated a profound emotional crisis in Foucault's life. Without going into much detail, Foucault refers to the "malaise"<sup>27</sup> and the "great personal discomfort"<sup>28</sup> that resulted from his experience of working at Sainte-Anne. The situation appears to have centered on Roger, a patient of Foucault's, who was subjected to the ultimate act of therapeutic despair, namely, a prefrontal lobotomy, when he did not respond to treatment by other, less drastic means. Macey is no doubt correct when he says that "given Foucault's own depressive tendencies," the encounter with Roger "must have had a considerable impact." Not only does it seem to have derailed Foucault's plans to become a psychiatrist, but it also seems to have left him with an "indelible image of suffering."<sup>29</sup>

As a result of this experience – which was compounded by the break-up of his volatile relationship with the young avant-garde composer Jean-Paul Barraqué – Foucault ended his training as psychologist and departed Paris for Uppsala, Sweden, where Georges Dumézil helped him secure a position in the French department at the university. (He was simultaneously appointed to a cultural position as the director of the Maison de France in Uppsala.) Before leaving France, Foucault had signed a contract to write a history of psychiatry – as well as a history of death – with a small independent publishing house.<sup>30</sup> When he moved to Uppsala, he had the good fortune to discover in the Bibliotheca Walleriana "a trove of documents about the history of psychiatry."<sup>31</sup> The project on the history of psychiatry was never carried out as it was originally conceived. But the extensive research that Foucault pursued in the Swedish archives eventually took shape as *Madness and Civilization*, which he submitted as his thesis for the Doctor of Letters in France. He makes it clear that through the writing a book on the history of psychiatry his "malaise," the personal suffering he had gone through while working at Sainte Anne, was transmuted – sublimated? – into a piece of "historical criticism of a structural analysis."<sup>32</sup> With *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault's years of apprenticeship had come to an end, and "his lifelong project had begun to take shape."<sup>33</sup>

### III

The argument of *Madness and Civilization* is based on a variation of what Foucault later, in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, would

call the “repressive hypothesis.” As he saw it, the rise of modern rationality involved the simultaneous expulsion of the mad from the community and the exclusion of madness from scientific rationality, as well as the systematic “cover-up” of this act of repression.<sup>34</sup> Once this twofold exclusion had taken place, madness became the deep disavowed truth of modern rationality, as unreason became the reason of an inverted world. The form of analysis, or, more accurately, of critique that is implied by the repressive hypothesis, is the “hermeneutics of suspicion.”<sup>35</sup> Its job is to unmask the cover-up, retrieve the repressed material – the deep “truth” of madness – and use it as an “infrarational”<sup>36</sup> norm with which to criticize the modern world.

Foucault’s narrative begins in the late Middle Ages. In what became a trademark of his brand of social theory, he traces the relation between developments in architectural and urban space on the one hand and institutional and conceptual space on the other. After the plague had run its course in Europe, the houses that had domiciled its victims remained standing in the *périphérique* surrounding the walls of the town. Because these “haunting” structures served as a reminder of what the plague had meant, they contributed to “a great disquiet”<sup>37</sup> that took hold in Europe in the fifteenth century. Foucault seems to suggest that, by some sort of unspecified compulsion, these “empty place[s]”<sup>38</sup> of negativity could not remain vacant indefinitely, but had to be occupied.

Just as individuals externalize the “bad” parts of themselves outside the boundaries of the ego, Foucault seems to be saying, the late medieval town “extrojected” its intolerable members, the mad, beyond its portals and tried to contain them and their significance in the abandoned lazar houses. However, unlike those that would follow in modernity, these acts of exclusion were not yet absolute. Symbolically, the walls of the city, which is to say, the boundaries of organized communal life, were relatively porous. Though the mad physically occupied an area beyond the city gates, they were *included* in the town’s communicative nexus. Indeed, the mad were not simply tolerated, but – in the traditions of the sacred fool, the possessed shaman, and the blind soothsayer of many premodern cultures – were valued for their unique wisdom and contribution to the spiritual “thickness of . . . the human world.”<sup>39</sup> In the institutionalized limit experiences of festivals, carnivals, and Saturnalia – where the norms

of everyday existence are suspended and the established mores subjected to mockery and derision – medieval society institutionalized regularized exchanges with unreason. As opposed to the “classical age” that later silenced it, late medieval society was engaged in the “dramatic debate”<sup>40</sup> with madness.

The first major turning point in Foucault's narrative occurs in Paris in 1657, the year of the Great Confinement – an event that came to stand for all the subsequent acts of exclusion that followed in modernity. Approximately one percent of the population was rounded up “almost over night”<sup>41</sup> and incarcerated in the *hopitaux généraux* – the precursor of the asylum, which replaced the vacated lazar house as the sociophysical space for housing the mad. Similar roundups occurred, according to Foucault, in the *Zuchthäusern* of Germany and the workhouses and bridewells in Britain. Incarcerated in this new setting, which was more of a penal than a medical institution, the madman was expelled from the communicative nexus of the community and ceased to be a potential interlocutor with whom one could engage in a profound dialogue. He ceased, that is, to be “an eschatological figure . . . at the limits of the world” and was reduced to an object of fear and contempt that had to be physically isolated and conceptually objectified. Madness came to be seen as the radical and devalued other of an enlightened reason, a reason that claimed to have *purified* itself of all irrational contaminants. Once the “great debate” between reason and madness was silenced, and normalizing rationality – “*which is a monologue of reason about madness*” – had established its hegemony, “*modern man no longer communicate[d] with the madman.*”<sup>42</sup> Therewith, according to Foucault, the “classical experience of madness is born.”

The second major turning point in Foucault's narrative occurs in 1794, when the French psychiatrist Pinel freed the inmates at Bicêtre from their shackles. According to conventional history, this act, part of the reform movement that rode the crest of the French Revolution, is unambiguously progressive – a major step forward in the humane treatment of the mad, and marks the birth of the modern enlightened psychiatric hospital. Indeed, Charcot – who considered himself a republican – thought it so significant that hanging in his lecture hall he had a painting of Pinel shattering a patient's manacles.<sup>43</sup> Foucault, however, finds something deeply objectionable, indeed ominous, in the new psychiatric humanism. What



passed for benevolent liberation and claimed to base itself on positive science, he argues, was in fact "*moralizing sadism*."<sup>44</sup> External constraints were simply replaced with internalized ones, the "mind-forg'ed manacles"<sup>45</sup> of conscience – and madman now coerced into redirecting his own gaze inwards, at his own internal world. "The free terror of madness," Foucault writes, was replaced by "the stifling anguish of responsibility," his fear and guilt organized into "a consciousness of himself."<sup>46</sup> And if patients failed to conform to the requirements of the institution, the manacles were reapplied.

Foucault's objection to the inwardly directed gaze rests on the unstated assumption that self-observation is, by its very nature, violent. Because *le regard* is considered intrinsically malevolent, there is no possibility of a non-objectionable split between an observing and an observed part of the self and a form of benign self-exploration. There is no place in Foucault's thinking for the distinction between an observing ego, motivated by epistemophilic curiosity – the necessary precondition for a psychoanalytic process – and the continuous scrutiny of a sadistic superego.<sup>47</sup> Despite his rebellion against Sartre, Foucault adheres to the master's "paranoid ontology of the gaze."<sup>48</sup> The loving sparkle in the mother's – or lover's – eye<sup>49</sup> has no place in Foucault's thinking, only the panoptic gaze of the persecutory father.

Foucault also finds difficulties with the persona of the psychiatrist. Despite the trappings of positivist science, the psychiatrist gains his therapeutic efficacy not as a scientist, but as a *homo medicus*, – a wise, moral, and paternal figure thought to possess esoteric knowledge and magical powers. In psychoanalytic terms, Foucault claims that the therapeutic successes achieved by nineteenth-century psychiatry did not result from the application of scientifically validated technique but from the manipulation of the positive paternal transference to the figure of the omnipotent doctor. And whereas psychiatric technique was basically "thaumaturgical" rather than scientific, the aim of the treatment was moral rather than medical. Not only is the psychiatrist the psychic stand-in for the bourgeois father-doctor, the goal of the treatment is to adjust the patient to the norms and behavior of respectable bourgeois life. The asylum "denounces everything that opposes the essential virtues of society . . . [and] sets itself the task of the homogeneous rule of morality, its rigorous extension to all those who tend to escape from it."<sup>50</sup> Bourgeois normality, in short, is equated with psychic health.

Once madness had been silenced and normalizing rationality had won the day, only a handful of extraordinary individuals were able to reestablish contact with what Foucault considers the deep transcendent truth of madness. The names of these "noble heirs of Rameau's nephew" – Sade, Hölderlin, Van Gogh, Nerval, Nietzsche, and Artaud – make up the roster of Foucault's *pantheon maudit*. Though, as LaCapra observes, it is clear that Foucault wants to "join his voice to theirs," he is generally content to "invoke their names in a litany of transgression" and doesn't engage their work in any significant detail.<sup>51</sup> Looked at more closely, however, Foucault seems to be of two minds regarding his heroes. And his divided attitude defines the fundamental split in *Madness and Civilization*. At times, he applauds them for their commitment to *the project of transgression*, that is, to "an unrestrained aesthetic of the transgressive, traumatizing, quasi-transcendent sublime."<sup>52</sup> Because of their unique talents, sensitivities, passions, and even madness, these exemplary individuals are, through eschatological limit experiences, able to project themselves beyond the boundaries of the modern epistémé and directly recapture the uncontaminated experience of madness. (Foucault is well aware of the *aporia* involved with such a conception.) In this case, the transcendent "truth" of madness can be used as a norm with which to criticize bourgeois modernity *in toto*. The tables are turned and the inverted universe set aright: "The world that thought to measure and justify madness through psychology must justify itself before madness."<sup>53</sup> At other times, however, Foucault seems to praise his heroes for having reestablished *the dialogue with unreason*. Such a dialogue would have a salutary effect on both reason and unreason or madness – he never clearly distinguishes between the two. On the one side, it would undo the exclusion and stigmatization madness has suffered in modernity. On the other, reason would become richer, broader, and suppler by reintegrating the madness it had split off and disavowed. It should be stressed that, for such a dialogue to take place, *both partners – the representatives of reason and unreason – must be willing to place their positions on the table and submit them to scrutiny*.

Which is the proper program – the project of transgression or the dialogue with unreason? Foucault is never able to make up his mind about this question, which is at the heart of *Madness and Civilization*. And his indecision, in turn, determines the oscillations of

his *fort-da* game with Freud. Although he is too sophisticated to be unaware of the theoretical and political difficulties involved in the transgressive program and the idealization of madness – and claims to give it up in later works – Foucault was forever tempted to affirm the project of transgression. And because of this temptation, he wasn't able to sustain his endorsement of the dialogue with unreason – which means of Freud and psychoanalysis. (Indeed, after *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault dropped the idea of such a dialogue completely.) Foucault's praise for Freud occurs when he is in an affirmative mode vis-à-vis the dialogue with unreason. The founder of psychoanalysis is then joined together with the heirs of Rameau's nephew – especially Nietzsche – and together they are seen as the only ones to have reestablished the debate with madness, which was broken off after the middle ages. The relevant text deserves to be quoted in its entirety:

This is why we must do justice to Freud. [Unlike the other psychiatrists], Freud went back to madness at the level of its *language*, reconstituted one of the essential elements of an experience reduced to silence by positivism; he did not make a major addition to the list of psychological treatments for madness; he restored, in medical thought, the possibility of a dialogue with unreason. . . . It is not psychology that is involved in psychoanalysis: but precisely an experience of unreason that it has been psychology's meaning, in the modern world, to mask.<sup>54</sup>

In a perceptive reading of this passage, Derrida detects a trace of antagonism even in Foucault's apparent praise for Freud. And this antagonism defines Foucault's negative posture towards the psychoanalyst. Derrida points out that the phrase "one must do justice to" suggests the necessity of "correcting an impulse" to commit an injustice. "One is . . . recommending resisting a temptation," in this case, *to subsume Freud under normalizing psychiatry*. Derrida writes that "since it is still necessary to call for vigilance . . . such a temptation must still be threatening [to Foucault] and liable to reemerge."<sup>55</sup>

When Foucault is in his other mode – of championing the project of transgression – this temptation to locate Freud in the history of normalizing psychiatry is exactly what emerges. In this case, Freud is not situated on the side of Foucault's transgressive heroes but on the side of "the immemorial figures of the Father and the Judge, of Family and Law, in the order of Order, of Authority and Punishment," as

Derrida puts it.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, when Foucault praises Freud for having broken with hospital psychiatry, it is basically a backhanded compliment. That is, although he praises Freud for having “demystified” most of the structures of the psychiatric asylum, he argues that the one feature of the asylum Freud retained – and even intensified – was in fact the most central and pernicious: “He exploited the structure that enveloped the medical personage; he amplified its thaumaturgical virtues, preparing for its omnipotence a quasi-divine status.” Which is to say, although the psychoanalytic situation abandons the external features of the asylum, it comes to concentrate almost exclusively on “the doctor–patient couple,”<sup>57</sup> that is, the transference. Whereas earlier Foucault had praised Freud for having “restored . . . the possibility of a dialogue with unreason,” he now argues that psychoanalysis, because it concentrates on the father–doctor transference, is unable “to hear the voices of unreason, nor to decipher in themselves the signs of the madman.”<sup>58</sup>

The analytic setting, which intentionally isolates and intensifies the transference relationship, serves in turn to increase the “moralizing sadism” of the process. The analyst’s position behind the couch turns him into an absolute unobserved Observer, and his “pure and circumspect Silence”<sup>59</sup> transforms him into an unreachable Judge. Thus psychoanalysis’ advance over medical psychiatry consists, as Derrida puts it, in having achieved “*confinement without confinement*,”<sup>60</sup> which is a dubious form of advancement indeed.

#### IV

Although the dialogue with unreason is an “enticing” idea, the nature of such a dialogue, as LaCapra observes, remains an “obscure matter.” In fact, there is a question whether it “it is a dialogue in any fathomable sense” of the term. What’s more, as I have noted, Foucault doesn’t provide much help in elucidating the idea, contenting himself to evoke it in a largely “prophetic” manner.<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings of Foucault’s account of the dialogue with unreason, the idea can provide a useful point of departure for two interrelated discussions. First, the idea suggests a program for a non-rationalistic critical theory, which incorporates the valid kernel of the project of transgression without falling into the idealization of

it. And second, the notion can help us develop a normative conception of psychoanalysis. I would like to pursue that second suggestion here.

We must consider the possibility, alluded to by LaCapra, that the dialogue with unreason is an incoherent idea. A number of major philosophers have argued that it is self-contradictory to believe that reason can gain access to an extra-discursive referent like madness in order to carry on a dialogue with it,<sup>62</sup> Derrida, whose critique is perhaps the best known, maintains that "dialogue" is a misnomer for the exchange between reason and its "contrary" that Foucault is aiming at. Not without cause, Derrida claims that, by definition, the term "dialogue" denotes a process that is "interior to logos in general" – that is to say, it is an intra-linguistic affair.<sup>63</sup> Whatever its exact nature, Derrida insists that the break Foucault is attempting to describe must be a "cleavage" or "*dissension*" within logos.<sup>64</sup> To dismiss Foucault with technically correct yet rather obvious transcendental-type arguments, however, isn't particularly enlightening. As with all serious thinkers, it's only worth engaging Foucault if one is willing to grant that there is something important in what he is doing. Anyway, Foucault is too sophisticated not to know that his enterprise is, strictly speaking, indefensible – indeed even "impossible."<sup>65</sup> But pursue it he does. His "audacity,"<sup>66</sup> for which Derrida is even forced to admit a certain admiration, involves the attempt to return – both historically and conceptually – to a "*zero point*" where reason and madness are not clearly distinguished.<sup>67</sup> Such a zero point is, by its very nature, prior to the creation of science and is therefore not "*controlled by . . . the teleology of truth nor the rational sequence of causes, since causes have value and meaning only beyond the division.*"<sup>68</sup>

But if Foucault isn't attempting to provide a strictly discursive argument in *Madness and Civilization*, what is he trying to do? An observation he makes in his discussion of Descartes' *Meditations* may help to provide an answer. The *Meditations*, as Foucault sees them, aren't simply a discursive undertaking, but an experiential exercise, lying at the "intersection of demonstrative and ascetic" – which is to say, cognitive and affective – "webs." Their purpose isn't simply to persuade readers through rational arguments. They also try to involve readers in an *experience* in which their natural attitude is subverted and their inner dynamics realigned so that they come to see

things in a new way. Foucault, I would maintain, is attempting the same sort of thing in *Madness and Civilization*: attempting to induce a particular experience in the readers, which will transport them back to that zero point. Indeed, he says as much when he refers to it as his "experience book." And if the book employs hortatory and prophetic rhetoric – rather than cool argument – the purpose is to bring about a limit experience in the reader. *Madness and Civilization* is itself a thaumaturgic work.

The idea of a limit experience, as it is understood within the project of transgression, is eschatological. It doesn't unfold over time but seeks to reach the "Absolute" all at once – to have it "shot from a pistol."<sup>69</sup> Psychoanalysis, in contrast, is a *methodical limit practice*. It doesn't try to catapult itself beyond the boundaries of the thinkable and the sayable in a single act, but, through daily clinical work, it seeks to expand those limits from within and integrate pre-verbal material and affectively driven experience into consciousness, language, and psychic structure.

Foucault's inability to appreciate the nature of psychoanalysis results, to a large degree, from his hostility to its concentration on "the doctor–patient couple," that is, on the transference. *For the transference is the medium in which the encounter with unreason takes place*. Situated at the intersection between discursive and affective webs, psychoanalytic practice induces its own particular process, namely, a transference regression, which – like shamanistic possession, hysterical disassociation, Mesmerism, and hypnosis – can be located in "the history of the trance."<sup>70</sup> The regressive transference neurosis churns up unreason, the affectively saturated material of archaic mentation – so that it can be experienced, understood, and worked through.<sup>71</sup> Thus, analysis isn't merely an interpretive enterprise, "interior to logos," in which one linguistic proposition is translated into another. It is rather an undertaking where nonpropositional *forces*, the forces that are unleashed in the transference, do violence to propositional structures.<sup>72</sup>

A paradoxical requirement lies at the heart of clinical psychoanalysis. An authentic analytic process requires that a certain type of madness, the transference-madness, be induced in the patient. Without it, analysands' defensive structures remain intact and the archaic strata of their psyches are never reached. But if the transference-madness becomes so intense that it overwhelms the

ego's functioning, it passes over into a transference-*psychosis*, which puts the ego's observing functioning out of commission so that analysis cannot proceed. In short, too little madness, the analytic process never gets off the ground; too much madness, it comes to a halt. This state of affairs places extremely taxing, indeed, almost contradictory demands on analysands, namely, they must have the capacity to give themselves over to the transference-madness without it spilling over into a transference-*psychosis* – at least for any prolonged period.

There is something peculiar about an encomium to madness that criticizes psychoanalysis for concentrating on the transference. Because the transference is as André Green argues,<sup>73</sup> one place where madness can still be encountered – indeed must be encountered, if an analysis worth its name is going to occur – in a relatively undiluted form. It is also odd that Foucault, the critic of disenchanting reason, faults psychoanalysis for its involvement with “thaumaturgy.” How else could madness – the Other of a disenchanting world – possibly manifest itself, except in conjunction with magic?<sup>74</sup>

Green points out that before psychiatry set out to transform itself into a strict science, the term “madness” had been part of its vocabulary. But as the discipline became progressively normalized, “madness” came to be viewed as an imprecise everyday concept, associated with such dubious topics as witchcraft, possession, and demonology, topics that had no place in a mature scientific discipline. “Madness” was therefore largely dropped from the psychiatric lexicon and replaced by the more technical “*psychosis*.”

Green insists, however, that a concept of madness, as distinct from *psychosis* in the technical sense, is still necessary for understanding important aspects of everyday life and clinical experience. Like Foucault, he identifies madness, which, for him, is closely related to passion, with *hubris* – an excessiveness that always contains the threat of formlessness, chaos, and violence. But unlike Foucault, he explains that excess in psycho-physiological terms, that is, in terms of the force of the drives. The extremity and even violence of mad-passionate states – which have their origins in the “original madness”<sup>75</sup> of the child's erotic tie to his or her first love object – result from an upsurge of the drives of such intensity that it cannot be contained and disrupts ego functioning. Though it may manifest itself in the malfunctioning of thought,

madness isn't primarily "a disorder or reason,"<sup>76</sup> but a malady of uncontainable affect. In its less extreme forms, madness-passion upsets routinized everyday perceptions, judgments, and behaviors, giving rise to the extravagances, recklessness, foibles, and creativity without which life would be a lackluster affair. Only when madness transgresses a certain limit does it not only interfere with, but also overwhelm the ego's functioning in general – including its ability to observe and represent – and result in psychosis in the strict sense.

Foucault's criticisms of the objectifying and instrumental nature of psychiatric diagnostics are often well taken, but they generally don't apply to analysis. What Foucault disregards when he tries to consign Freud to the tradition of medical psychiatry – remember, Freud wanted to protect psychoanalysis from the physicians no less than from the priests – is that analysts aren't primarily concerned with the question of diagnosis, but of *analyzability* – or *workability*, as many analysts would put it today. In fact, many analysts agree with Foucault's criticisms. Is a prospective patient capable of meeting the arduous and knotty demands outlined above: can she or he be an interlocutor in the analytic dialogue with unreason – working to understand archaic mentation and affective states and putting them into words?

A consideration of the Foucault–Derrida debate can help us to understand why Foucault could never fully endorse the dialogue with unreason. Underlying their disagreement is the fact that Foucault and Derrida operate with different conceptions of madness. For Derrida madness is something like *acute hallucinatory psychosis*, which still presupposes the existence of a representing subject, however impaired. The psychosis consists in the fact that the representations that are in the madman's consciousness are delusional. Derrida can then argue that, in taking up the case of dreaming – which can be seen as a "normal" form of hallucinatory psychosis – Descartes has in fact included madness in the *Meditations*. But this conception isn't radical enough for Foucault. He grants Derrida that the Cartesian meditator takes up and considers certain mad phenomena: delusions of being someone or something else, perceptual hallucinations, and so on. Foucault's problem is that a *subject still remains, who can take up, represent, and consider anything at all* – no matter how delusional or hallucinatory the representations. *Nothing short*



of the fragmentation of the representing subject will satisfy him. For Foucault, madness means *acute fragmentary psychosis*. This is the stringent criterion that Foucault insists on when he claims that the *Meditations* exclude madness. But the dissolution of the representing subject – of the observing ego – would mean the destruction of the interlocutor who can participate in the psychoanalytic dialogue with unreason as I am describing it.

Although the psychoanalytic dialogue with unreason is a mutual enterprise, involving the intense participation of both partners, it isn't symmetrical. The analyst, the representative of *logos*, retains a degree of privilege. This is a point where the partisans of unreason can legitimately lodge an objection. They can argue that the situation is rigged and that by asking unreason to enter into a dialogue with reason, one is asking it to surrender to the demands of *logos* at the start. Marcel Gauchet and Gladys Swain provide a sophisticated and nuanced response to this objection.<sup>77</sup> They argue that, even if their intention was to spread the virtues of the bourgeoisie, when the humanist psychiatrist-therapists attempted to communicate with their patients, they entered a radically novel situation. In talk therapy, one cannot be assured that the preconditions for communications are ever in place. The two partners of the therapeutic dyad must work out their shared understanding on their own, without any preestablished "banisters."<sup>78</sup> Both individuals, Gauchet and Swain argue, are split subjects, with one foot planted in their own private world, their *cosmos idios*, and one in the world of consensually validated reality, the *cosmos koinonia*. The difference is that the patient is further withdrawn from the realm of intersubjective meaning, whereas the psychiatrist-therapist remains more firmly planted in it.<sup>79</sup>

In this situation, the creation and expansion of a domain of shared meaning is the precondition and the goal of treatment in that therapists must form communicative ties, therapeutic alliances, with their patients not only for the work to progress, but simply for it to get under way. To do this, they must capitalize on whatever area of overlap there is between their patient's subjective world and their own, and use this as a staging ground for expanding a realm of shared understanding. In the process, the conditions for mutual understanding are continually open for mutual interrogation and clarification. The creation and expansion of shared meaning is also is the goal of

treatment insofar as the patient's emergence from the *cosmos idios* and progressive entry into the mutually created *cosmos koinonia* is a central aim.

The whole idea of a therapeutic as opposed to some other type of relationship only makes sense on the assumption that the relationship between analyst and analysand is asymmetrical. Although analysts are split subjects like their patients, they are more firmly planted in the world of consensual meaning. Those who idealize madness – for example, the surrealists R. D. Laing and the Foucault of *Madness and Civilization* – don't only reject the asymmetry claim on the grounds that it retains the privileged authoritarian position of the psychiatrist-therapist. I believe they want to go further and maintain that the relationship is asymmetrical, but in the opposite direction. That is, implicitly or explicitly, *they believe that the delirious discourse of the patient is the true discourse*. And by idealizing madness, they spare themselves the effort of trying to understand it. Although Foucault asks the psychiatrist-therapist to interrogate his or her own position and reason, he is not willing to insist that the mad also call their discourse into question. This is another way of understanding why he wasn't able to embrace the dialogue with unreason – in which both partners' positions would be put on the table – but had to stick with the project of transgression.

But, as Gauchet and Swain argue, if therapists are to remain therapists, they must not allow their laudable desire to respect their patients' dignity to let them be coerced into simply affirming the truth of the patient's delirious discourse. They must remain representatives of the *cosmos koinonia*. In fact, Gauchet and Swain maintain that if therapists "were to abdicate complacently in the face of the derangement that has the upper hand with" patients or "go along" with their assertion of the superior truth of their "certitudes," they would "be misunderstanding and ridiculing" them. For the therapist would be acting as if there were not, within the patient, "a human being suffering frightfully from his all-absorbing empty certitudes," yearning to escape the anguish of his or her loneliness and join the human community. Therapeutic skill consists in maintaining "two positions at once." Clinicians must know how to reach individuals who are largely "outside of reason" by entering into the same desires, fantasies, and anxieties they share with them. And they must know how to remain representatives of the *logos* at the same time.<sup>80</sup>

This is not to say, however, Foucault's criticisms of psychoanalysis are entirely without merit. Beginning with Freud, analysts have not always been exemplary in their willingness to examine their own positions and the "power relation" within which an analysis "unfolds."<sup>81</sup> Freud, a product of nineteenth-century patriarchal culture, argued in fact that the positive transference to the father-doctor is "unobjectionable" and ought to be left unanalyzed. Whereas he saw the rejection of suggestion as the feature that separated psychoanalysis from all other forms of psychotherapy, he contradicted himself and recommended that the positive transference should be exploited, for it is "the vehicle of success in psychoanalysis as it is in other methods of treatment."<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, in a piece of wishful thinking, Freud – who took natural science as his ideal – maintained that analysts can largely purify themselves of the contaminations of the countertransference, which means of their own wishes, conflicts, and pathology. Thus they would be able to function as blank screens and neutrally observe their patients' transferences as they unfold. These ideas have, for the most part, been rejected since Freud's death – especially in the last thirty years.

With the rejection of the blank screen, the question of countertransference – of the nature of the therapist's subjective position, which Foucault raised when he turned the tables on the psychiatrists – has recently moved to the center of many psychoanalytic discussions. The field had warded off the subject for many years because of its troublesome implications concerning the objectivity, authority, and even health of the analyst – because, that is, it forces analysts to put their own selves on the line. Indeed, the topic of countertransference calls into question the very distinction that Foucault finds so offensive – namely, between the normal, healthy doctor and the sick patient. Heinrich Racker, a pioneer in the study of the topic, writes that countertransference debunks the myth that

analysis is an interaction between a sick person and a healthy one. The truth is that it is an interaction between two personalities, in both of which the ego is under pressure from the id, the superego, and the external world; each personality has its internal and external dependencies, anxieties, and pathological defenses; each is also a child with its internal parents; and each of these whole personalities – that of the analysand and that of the analyst – responds to every event of the analytic situation.<sup>83</sup>

Anyone who has digested these facts sufficiently would have great difficulty maintaining the posture of the detached, authoritarian, and purely objective expert who has been cleansed of all psychopathology, a posture that, unfortunately, has often characterized much analysis over the years. To acknowledge the significance of the countertransference means the analyst's behavior, personality, and pathology must be grist for the psychoanalytic dialogue with unreason. Today most analysts believe that it is advisable to analyze as many of the imagos of the powerful parental figures of childhood as possible in order to maximize a person's autonomy and maturity. And the imago of the father-doctor is central among them. But the recognition of the countertransference doesn't require that the authority of the analyst and the asymmetry of the analytic setting must be given up. It has, however, certainly forced the field into a widespread and difficult debate over the meaning of these concepts.

## V

In *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Foucault attempts to exorcise the specter of Freud once and for all. He doesn't, however, try to accomplish his goal through a frontal encounter with the substance of the Freudian position. Psychoanalytic texts are rarely discussed and Freud is hardly mentioned. Instead, Foucault attempts an end run around Freud, trying to trump psychoanalysis, as a theoretical and practical project, through an archaeological reduction of its significance. Ten years earlier, in *The Order of Things*,<sup>84</sup> he had briefly presented psychoanalysis in a positive light, as a critical counter-science that could guide the archaeological attack on humanism. Now, however, it is seen as an invidious form of humanism, which must itself become the object of archaeological critique. Freud isn't even granted the grandeur of a dangerous adversary – of the devil – who must be vanquished, but is reduced to a bit player in a much larger drama. Likewise, psychoanalysis isn't viewed as a revolutionary science that transformed the modern *Zeitgeist*. It is seen, instead, as a rather minor episode within what Foucault calls “the deployment of sexuality.” In a roundtable discussion, the analyst Jaques-Alain Miller confronted Foucault with the thesis that the philosopher was using “a complex strategy” that aimed at erasing “the break that is located with Freud.”<sup>85</sup> And Foucault didn't deny it. In a revealing

exchange, Miller presses Foucault on the arbitrary nature of his archaeology of psychoanalysis:

MILLER: It's a matter of appearances, is that what you are telling us?

FOUCAULT: Not a delusive appearance, but a fabrication.

MILLER: Right, and so it's motivated by what you want, or hope, you're. . . .

FOUCAULT: Correct, and that's where the polemical or political objective comes in.<sup>86</sup>

Foucault's choice of the deployment of sexuality as his master narrative is, in other words, unabashedly decisionist. With his "history of the present," Foucault has dropped all aspirations of disinterested scientific objectivity and feels free to adopt whatever starting point suits his political agenda – in this case, the nullification of the importance of psychoanalysis.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which sees the Victorian era as the apotheosis of a repressive culture, Foucault claims that nineteenth-century bourgeois society was "a society of blatant and fragmented perversion."<sup>87</sup> He arrives at this rather unlikely conclusion through his analysis of the "deployment of sexuality." Beginning in the eighteenth century, the growing capitalist economy required a predictable and manageable population, which could reliably supply workers for its factories and consumers for its goods. This led power – which, became "bio-power" in the process<sup>88</sup> – to intervene into the biological substratum of society, that is, into reproduction, sanitation, nutrition, health, and family life, in a way that was historically unprecedented. The human sciences – for example, criminology, social work, and modern psychiatry – were created and new means of social monitoring like diagnostic categorization, case dossiers, and statistical analysis were devised to guarantee the normalized homogeneous population required by the interests of the bourgeoisie. Central among the new fields was the *Scientia Sexualis*, the science of sexuality, which, according to Foucault, purports to be a legitimate positive science that studies the biological dimension of human sexuality, but in fact is an ideological pseudo-science aimed at social engineering. "A normalizing society is," Foucault argues, "the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life."<sup>89</sup>

With his thesis of the "perverse implantation,"<sup>90</sup> there is an externalizing gesture at the heart of Foucault's argument. Psychoanalysis traces perverse sexuality to *internal* sources, namely, to the

instinctual-unconscious life of the individual. They represent the continuation of the polymorphous perversity of infantile sexuality into adult life. With their source in the schema of psychosexual development, which has its *Anlagen* in the child's inherited constitution, perverse impulses are ubiquitous and part of our biological endowment. Foucault, on the other hand, sees perverse sexuality as coming *from the outside*: It is implanted in the individual by the deployment of sexuality. In an obvious allusion to the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, Foucault argues that, in the nineteenth century, there was a society-wide "incitement to discourse" in which everything having to do with sex "had to be told." Foucault seems to be connecting the pornography of *My Secret Life*, the arcane tomes of sexologists like Kraft-Ebbing, and the clinical interviews of the psychiatrists and social workers in order to argue that there was a "veritable discursive explosion" which overstimulated the population and created a hypersexualized society.<sup>91</sup> This sounds more like today's Rio de Janeiro than Manchester, England, in the nineteenth century.

This wholesale stimulation of sexuality fulfilled a specific function for the apparatus of power. Foucault maintains that by first implanting this sexuality in the population, power could later extract it "from people's bodies,"<sup>92</sup> manipulate it, and channel it for its own purposes.<sup>93</sup> Foucault traces these practices back to the "a power relation"<sup>94</sup> in the thirteenth century, when the Church ordered all Christians "to kneel at least once a year and confess to all their transgressions, without omitting a single one."<sup>95</sup> But Foucault argues that the wishes, fantasies, and dreams confessed by the penitents weren't intrinsic; they didn't derive from the inner world of their unconscious-instinctual lives. They therefore didn't represent deep and difficult truths, rooted in biology, and emanating from the depths of the personality. Rather, those transgressive proclivities were implanted in the penitents by the priests as a way of manipulating them.

Foucault uses his analysis of the confession in an attempt to condemn psychoanalysis by insinuation. His strategy, as Jacques-Alain Miller recognizes, is to subsume psychoanalysis under the normalizing practices that extend from pastoral power to the apparatus of sexuality "by drawing on one key aspect, relevant for the purpose of inclusion in archaeology, which is summed up in

the syntagma: 'talking about sex'."<sup>96</sup> "Talking about sex" is, however, a rather undifferentiated concept that can subsume an array of radically heterogeneous and even contradictory phenomena. Telling children about the sinfulness of masturbation or premarital sex is entirely different from informing them about the importance of practicing safe sex. This undifferentiated analysis is made possible by the deficiencies of Foucault's genealogical approach. It is possible to grant – as Freud recognized<sup>97</sup> – that certain elements of psychoanalysis can be traced historically to the practice of confession and that the two institutions therefore bear a certain formal resemblance to each other without at the same time equating them. The identification of antecedents and formal similarities doesn't establish identity of function. It is particularly malicious for Foucault to put Freud, the "Godless Jew," militant anti-cleric, and champion of sexual enlightenment, on the same side as his arch-enemy, the Catholic Church.

It is necessary to recognize how far Foucault's constructivism actually goes. He wants to completely deny the existence of a biological dimension to human sexuality. This is apparent in his discussion of the *Scientia Sexualis*. Foucault doesn't simply argue – like many left-wing Freudians, feminists, and gays – that although our sexual identity rests on a biological substratum, the largest portion of our sexual life is socially constructed and therefore contingent and open to historical reconfiguration. He claims instead that the existence of such a biological substratum is *virtually an illusion*.<sup>98</sup> It is a construction of "the deployment of sexuality." The new *Scientia Sexualis*, motivated by power, must posit the existence of sex, which supposedly exists by nature, to legitimate itself. "Sex," in other words, is the pseudo-object of the pseudo-science of sexuality. It is, as Foucault puts it, "an imaginary point determined by the deployment of sexuality."<sup>99</sup> "Sexuality," in contrast, is

the name given to a historical construct, not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge/power.<sup>100</sup>

Sexuality, in short, is completely constructed and comes from the outside.

If "sex," understood as a biological concept, is invalidated, then psychoanalysis is deprived of one of its basic tenets, namely, "the repressive hypothesis."<sup>101</sup> Analysis, in both its conservative and left-wing versions, envisions a structure in which societal power must repress sexual desire. However, whereas the conservatives see this relation as transhistorical and immutable, the progressives view it as a historically contingent structure – indeed, as the product of capitalism – which can and ought to be replaced. It is part of Foucault's evasiveness that he doesn't directly confront Freud's version of the repressive hypothesis, canonically formulated in *Civilization and its Discontents*, directly, but instead attacks the cruder position of the Freudian leftists – who made up a good part of his milieu. He wants us to think that by refuting the Freudian left he has refuted Freud.

But Foucault's refutation of the Freudian left itself isn't successful. Foucault claims that by focusing on the struggle against repression, that is, on sexual emancipation, the Freudian left allowed itself to be duped by the deployment of sexuality. Its idea that there is a fundamental opposition between sex and power – and "that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power"<sup>102</sup> – is mistaken. Rather than being outside and opposed to power, sex is, as we have seen, itself created by power – by the deployment of sexuality – to serve its own ends. The Freudian left's attack on repression remains within the deployment of sexuality and at best amounts to a tempest in a teapot. The truly radical program, according to Foucault, would seek to "dismantle" the deployment of sexuality itself.<sup>103</sup>

But dismantle it in the name of what? "The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment," Foucault answers, "ought to be "bodies and pleasures."<sup>104</sup> The difficulty is, however, that "bodies and pleasures" is another one of those Foucauldian terms which, although evocative, has little content. Foucault's most extensive remarks on the topic – and they are scant – appear in his Introduction to the memoirs of *Herculine Barbin*, a nineteenth-century French hermaphrodite. Foucault begins with the question "Do we truly need a true sex?" – by which he means, Do we need *determine* sex that can be unambiguously situated in a distinct scientific,



medical, or legal category? Against “modern Western society,” which has consistently answered this question in the affirmative, Foucault answers that “one might have imagined that all that counted was the reality of the body and the intensity of its pleasures.”<sup>105</sup> Thus, whatever else it might mean, “bodies and pleasures” appears to denote the opposite of categorically determinate sex. For Foucault, Herculine represents that state of categorical indeterminacy – “the happy limbo of non-identity”<sup>106</sup> – that exists prior to the imposition of sexual determinacy. Indeed, the upshot of his Introduction is the lionization of pre-categorical and indeterminate – that is, polymorphous – sexuality, which is counterposed to the “true sex” that is imposed on the individual by the normalizing grid of the deployment of sexuality, that is, by power.

Foucault tries to indict psychoanalysis as a coconspirator in this “game of truth,” which tries to force sexual nonidentity into a classificatory scheme. He observes, more or less accurately, that “psychoanalysis has rightfully rooted its cultural vigor” in the idea that “our sex harbors what is most true in ourselves” and that “we must not deceive ourselves concerning” it. But he then goes on to imply that “discovering the truth about our sexuality” really means “discovering that we have one true sex,” thus again lumping the analysts together with the normalizers. Most psychoanalysts would probably agree that a desirable outcome of an analysis is the appropriation of an individual’s sexual identity through the deep exploration of his or her unconscious and past. However, a “true” identity, in this sense, is not something that is monolithic, unequivocal, and established once and for all; the notions of infantile sexuality, constitutional bisexuality, and the component instincts make that impossible. Rather, it is an ongoing task – something that must constantly be synthesized and re-synthesized out of myriad identifications with both sexes and with elements from all the stages of psychosexual development. In other words, successful identities must be highly differentiated unities that individuals continually integrate and reintegrate for themselves.

More generally, whereas Foucault wants to hoist Freud on the petard of naturalism and essentialism, he misses the decisive feature of the latter’s position. Dana Breen argues that Freud’s theory of sexuality defies the binary choice between biological naturalism

and essentialism versus historical constructivism:

It is part of the complexity of Freud's work that his theory has been seen by some as ascribing an inescapable biological destiny to man and woman, while others have understood him to uphold the revolutionary belief that, psychologically speaking, we are not born man or woman, and that masculinity and femininity are constructed over a period of time and are relatively independent of biological sex.

Breen goes on to maintain that this "duality" is not the result of confusion or indecision on Freud's part but is produced by "an inherent tension existing at the heart of the matter." This is the reason, moreover, "why this opposition is not going away and why the debate is still alive half a century after [Freud's] death."<sup>107</sup> To use Foucauldian language, human beings are biological-symbolic doublets – "sensible-intelligible hermaphrodites"<sup>108</sup> – and the relation between the two terms of the doublet is fundamentally contentious and will always be subject to debate.

Foucault presents himself as a tough-minded anti-utopian who has outgrown the naive illusions of the *ultra-gauchists*. But he is in fact even more utopian than the Freudian left. As Peter Dews argues, Foucault's rejection of the repressive hypothesis – conceived of as the opposition between power and its repressed or excluded other – is more apparent than real, not "abolished, but simply displaced."<sup>109</sup> By placing bodies and pleasures in the position of the violated other of the apparatus of sexuality – but not acknowledging that he is doing it – Foucault attempts to finesse his central dilemma. On the one hand, he still retains an extra-discursive, counter-norm to power, which, as Dews argues, a critique of power logically requires. And, to his credit, Foucault still wants to criticize power. On the other hand, by leaving the notion of bodies and pleasures so utterly indeterminate, he believes he has avoided the dangers of naturalism and essentialism.

Bodies and pleasures assume the character of pure, unformed matter that can be voluntarily shaped and reshaped – constructed – without constraint. This provides him with the requisite material for the aesthetic fashioning of the self at will, independently of historically instituted codes. But Foucault has basically lifted this scheme from perhaps the most preminent of Freudian leftists,

Herbert Marcuse. Whereas Marcuse envisioned the repression of polymorphous perversity by the Reality Principle, Foucault's pictures the violation of bodies and pleasures by the apparatus of sexuality. And though Foucault claims to reject utopianism – the omnipotent denial of our finitude – what could be more utopian than the infinite malleability of the body and sexuality? Or as Jacques-Alain Miller asks, what could be more utopian than this “body outside sex,”<sup>110</sup> that is, outside nature, which can be endlessly refashioned at will?

## NOTES

- 1 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1975).
- 2 James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 282. Furthermore, his friend and biographer Didier Eribon tells us that, throughout his adult life, Foucault was plagued by the question of whether to undertake an analysis. See Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 42.
- 3 In one of his earliest works, the introduction to Binswanger's *Dreams and Existence*, Foucault tried to stand Freud's theory of dreams on its head, thereby undermining the very foundation of psychoanalysis (Michel Foucault, “Dream, Imagination and Existence, An Introduction to Binswanger's *Dreams and Existence*,” trans. F. Williams, *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* 19 [1984–1985]: 47–54). This is something he repeated in the last volume he completed, *The Care of the Self* (Michel Foucault, *The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Volume 3*, trans. Robert Hurley [New York: Pantheon, 1986], chapter 1). Then in *Madness and Civilization*, his attitude toward Freud was divided down the middle (Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, trans. Richard Howard [New York: Pantheon, 1965], which is an abridged translation of *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* [Paris: Gallimard, 1961]). On the one side, he praised the founder of psychoanalysis for having reestablished the “dialogue with unreason” after it had been silenced by the rise of modern psychiatry. But on the other, he identified Freud with the repressive, authoritarian, and patriarchal psychiatrists. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault appeared to have the highest regard for psychoanalysis. Along with linguistics and anthropology, he praised it as one of the critical counter-sciences, which were sounding the death-knell for humanism and the human sciences. The (pseudo-) science he

was praising, however, was the structuralist psychoanalysis of Lacan, which, with its denial of meaning, autonomy and development, is not, I would maintain, the psychoanalysis of Freud (Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Pantheon, 1970), 373–387). Finally, in *The History of Sexuality: Volume I*, he reversed his position again. Psychoanalysis was now seen as the very embodiment of humanism, which itself had to be uprooted with archaeological critique. With this critique – and, even more importantly, with the supposed “refutation” of the repressive hypothesis – Foucault claimed to have nullified psychoanalysis once and for all.

- 4 Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols., James Strachey et al., eds. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953–1974), vol. XIII, 103.
- 5 Jacques Derrida, “‘To Do Justice to Freud’: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis,” trans. Pascale-Anne Brault et al., *Critical Inquiry* 20 (Winter 1994):242. See also John Forrester, “Michel Foucault and the History of Psychoanalysis,” in *The Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan and Derrida* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 286–316.
- 6 The received interpretation has it that Sartre was Foucault's principal adversary, and there is no doubt Foucault saw him as a major opponent, especially early in his career. The hostility towards Sartre, however, was not unique to Foucault. It was something he shared with most of the members of his philosophical cohort. Structuralism's and poststructuralism's assault on Sartrean humanism – with its emphasis on meaning, history, and the transparent subject – provided the conceptual arena in which the ascendant philosophical generation sought to displace the master. Although it concerned some of the same issues, Foucault's struggle with Freud was more distinctly his own. It not only lasted longer than whatever quarrel he had with Sartre, but also reached deeper into the conceptual and emotional sources animating his thinking.
- 7 I am purposely not using Freud's technical term “psychic reality” here. For Foucault wasn't only objecting to the exploration of psychic reality as Freud defined it, but of the interior realm – of which psychic reality is a part – in general.
- 8 See Hans Loewald, *Psychoanalysis and the History of the Individual* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 19ff.
- 9 Quoted in Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, “‘No Greater, Richer, More Mysterious Subject . . . Than the Life of the Mind’: An Early Exchange of Letters between Freud and Einstein,” *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 76 (1995): 117.

- 10 *Homo psychologicus*, in turn, became the prototype for “man” in Foucault’s work and psychiatry the prime example of the human sciences.
- 11 For a useful account of Foucault’s attempt to suppress the history of his apprenticeship as a young psychologist see Hubert Dreyfus, “Foreword,” in Michel Foucault, *Mental Illness and Psychology*, trans. Alan Sheridan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
- 12 Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 45.
- 13 See David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon, 1994), 35ff.
- 14 At the same time as he was pursuing the official route, however, Foucault’s dissatisfaction with the “professional philosophers” also led him to the Surrealists. What drew him to these avant-garde intellectuals was their interest in limit experiences and the deconstruction of the subject. Rather than trying to create rigorous systems, thinkers like Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, and Klossowski “tried to reach the point of life which lies as close as possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at the limit or the extreme” (Michel Foucault, “The ‘Experience Book,’” in *Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori*, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito [New York: Semiotext(e), 1991], 30–31). For our purposes, it is important to emphasize that the notion of deconstruction of the subject is incompatible with the study of psychology, for the dissolution of the subject deprives psychology of its object of investigation.
- 15 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 36–37.
- 16 If Foucault had his reservations about becoming an academic philosopher, he also had his doubts about the field of psychology: “His opinion of his chosen discipline [i.e., psychology] was not favorable. It was he argued, well known that a psychology graduate knew nothing and could do nothing because the revision required for all his certificates could easily be done sitting in the garden on a summer’s afternoon. Nor did he have a particularly high opinion of the psychology courses taught in the provincial universities; in his view, they were remarkable mainly for their soporific properties.” Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 46.
- 17 See especially Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 131.
- 18 As Eribon observes, the École Normale wasn’t the most benevolent environment one could imagine. He describes it as a downright “pathogenic milieu.” Not only was “the most absurd, the most eccentric behavior” looked up to as a sign of individuality, but the intellectual competition and pressure to demonstrate one’s brilliance, which must have been especially difficult for an awkward *Provençal* from Poitiers like Foucault,

was constant and fierce. In one eighteen-month period alone there were reported to have been eleven suicide attempts among the students. See Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 25ff; Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 45–47, 54–56; and Macy, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 27ff.

- 19 His biographers disagree over their reliability.
- 20 Eribon, *Foucault*, 28.
- 21 Macy, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 28. For a somewhat different account of Foucault's relation to his homosexuality during this period see Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 55–56.
- 22 Eribon, *Foucault*, 27.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 28. I would put it even more strongly. It is difficult to imagine where the passion that drives an individual to confront and endure the anguish that is involved in all genuine creative endeavors could originate, if not in such primary personal experiences.
- 24 If the fact that an individual suffered from psychological afflictions discredited his or her research into the workings of the human mind, there never would have been a credible student of the human psyche. It is almost a truism that all the great investigators of human psychopathology – Freud and Ferenczi no less than Lacan and Bion – entered the field to try to make sense out of their personal suffering. And the realm where they made their greatest contributions was generally determined, but also ultimately limited by the nature of their conflicts. For example, Freud – whose personal struggles centered on the relationship with his schlep of a father, was the master theorist of the Oedipus complex – was tone deaf when it came to the early relationship to the mother. Likewise, where Winnicott was acutely sensitive to pre-Oedipal experience and discovered the realm of transitional phenomena, the significance of the father plays a relatively minimal role in his thinking.
- 25 Although Eribon makes the correct case, there is something peculiar about using this argument to defend Foucault. Not only does Foucault fail to provide any arguments to show how his approach can avoid the genetic fallacy, it is clear that, for him, a genealogical analysis is meant to discredit the cultural work it is directed at. Like Nietzsche – at least as Foucault construes him – his attitude is “derisive and ironic.” By demonstrating their lowly origins, genealogy is “capable of undoing every infatuation” with the so-called higher things. Thus with regard to his genealogical critique of psychoanalysis, Foucault tries to reduce Freud's work to the nineteenth-century power relations that created the apparatus of sexuality. See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Donald F. Bouchard, ed., *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

- 1977), 139–164. For an alternative, non-deflationary interpretation of Nietzschean genealogy see Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 35, and Raymond Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” in *Morality, Culture and History: Essays on German Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–28.
- 26 Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, 28.
- 27 Michel Foucault, “The Minimalist Self,” in L. Kritzman, ed., *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 6.
- 28 Michel Foucault, “Truth, Power, Self,” in L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 11.
- 29 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 57. It appears, moreover, that Foucault entered psychoanalysis briefly during this period, but terminated the treatment “in a fit of pique when his therapist went on vacation.” See Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 62.
- 30 Macey, *Lives of Michel Foucault*, 61.
- 31 Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 96.
- 32 Foucault, “Minimalist Self,” 6. In “Truth, Power, Self,” he also states that “after three years I left the job and went to Sweden in great personal discomfort and started to write a history of these practices [*Madness and Civilization*],” 11.
- 33 Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 92.
- 34 Dreyfus, “Foreword,” xxviii.
- 35 See Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), 32–36.
- 36 Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 109.
- 37 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 13.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 6.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 22.
- 40 *Ibid.*, xii.
- 41 *Ibid.*, 66.
- 42 *Ibid.*, x–xii (emphasis in the original).
- 43 “In the hall in which he gave his lectures there hung a picture which showed ‘citizen’ Pinel having the chains taken off the poor madmen in Salpêtrière. The Salpêtrière which had witness so many horrors during the Revolution had also been the scene of this most humane of all revolutions.” Sigmund Freud, “Charcot,” in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols., James Strachey et al., eds.

- (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953–1974), vol. III, 18.
- 44 Foucault, *Mental Illness and Psychology*, 3 (emphasis in the original).
- 45 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 247.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 247. A central reason for Foucault's hostility to Sartre was the latter's emphasis on conscience and responsibility. Indeed, for Foucault, Sartre's philosophy represented a form of "terrorism." Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 38.
- 47 As Christopher Norris observed, at the heart of Foucault's critique of Freud, as well as of Kant – indeed, at the heart of his critique of the humanist paradigm – is a protest against the notion of conscience. That is, he objects to the notion of a moral agency in the psyche, which is created through the internalization of external authority, and through which, for Kant and Freud at least, the subject gains his or her autonomy. And the normative lacuna in Foucault's thinking results from the fact that although he repudiates the notion of conscience, he does not conceptualize an alternative moral agent to put in its place. Christopher Norris, "What Is Enlightenment?': Foucault on Kant," in *The Truth About Postmodernism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 67. A revised and shortened version of this article appears as "What Is Enlightenment?': Kant and Foucault," in Gary Gutting, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 159–196. For the topics this essay is concerned with, however, the longer version is much more relevant.
- 48 Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 408.
- 49 See Daniel N. Stern, "Acting versus Remembering in Transference Love and Infantile Love," in Ethel Person et al., eds., *On Freud's "Observations on Transference Love"* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 177. Jay also points out that "With characteristic ascetic rigor, Foucault thus resisted exploring visions reciprocal, intersubjective, communicative potential, that of the mutual glance. *Le regard* never assumed for him its alternative meaning in English as well as French: to pay heed to or care for someone else. The "care of the self" which he explored in his final work included a visual dimension only to the extent that it involved a 'certain manner of acting visible to others.' But the ethical cum aesthetic self-fashioning he found so compelling did not go beyond a kind of dandiacal display, which left out more interactive affective ties, such as those in the family." Jay, *Denigration of Vision*, 414–415.
- 50 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 258.



- 51 Dominick LaCapra, *History and Reading: Touqueville, Foucault, French Studies* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 140.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 167.
- 53 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 289. See also H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 11. It should be pointed out that the transgressive project is structurally related to the repressive hypothesis. Once it is assumed that the deep transcendent truth of modernity is repressed or excluded by power, the attempt to liberate it and assert it against power becomes a logical option.
- 54 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 198. Consider also: "[Madness] entered a phase of silence from which it was not to emerge for a longtime; it was deprived of its language, and although one continued to speak of it, it became impossible for it to speak of itself. Impossible at least until Freud, who was the first to open up once again the possibility of reason and unreason to communicate in the danger of a common language, every ready to break down and disintegrate into the inaccessible." Foucault, *Mental Illness and Psychology*, 69.
- 55 Derrida, "'To Do Justice to Freud'," 236.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 238.
- 57 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, 277.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 278.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 278.
- 60 Derrida, "'To Do Justice to Freud'," 261 (emphasis in the original)
- 61 La Capra, *History and Reading*, 130, 140. For an attempt to clarify the ambiguities surrounding the concept of unreason see Gary Gutting, "Foucault and the History of Madness," in Gary Gutting, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 56.
- 62 See, for example, Ian Hacking, "The Archaeology of Foucault," in David Couzens Hoy, ed., *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, (New York: Blackwell, 1978), 1–26; Richard Rorty, "Foucault and Epistemology," in David Couzens Hoy, ed., *Foucault: A Critical Reader* (New York: Blackwell, 1978), 41–50; Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), chapters 9 and 10; and Herbert Schnädelbach, "The Face in the Sand," in Axel Honneth et al., eds., trans. William Rehg, *Philosophical interventions into the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment* (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 311–340.
- 63 Derrida, "Cogito," 38–39 (emphasis in the original). I also recognize that the idea of a dialogue isn't entirely accurate in this context. However,

none of the alternatives I have considered – “the exchange with unreason,” “the encounter with unreason,” or, more ponderously, “the *Auseinandersetzung* with unreason” – are any more satisfactory. I have therefore decided to stick with the notion of a dialogue until I find a better alternative.

- 64 Derrida, “Cogito,” 38–39 (emphasis in the original).
- 65 *Ibid.*, 33.
- 66 *Ibid.*, 34.
- 67 The notion of a zero point is important, for it suggests the existence of a frontier realm in which the usual opposition of the logo-ontological tradition – between incoherent delirium and determinate thinking – isn’t firmly in place. See LaCapra, *History and Reading*, 132. See also Joel Whitebook, “Weighty Objects: Adorno’s Kant-Freud Critique,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 69–70.
- 68 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, xi.
- 69 G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Preface, 8, #29.
- 70 The term is Octave Manoni’s. It is quoted in Mikkel Borch-Jacobson, *The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect*, trans. Douglas Brick et al. (Stanford Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992), 114.
- 71 Foucault, the student of the relation between institutional arrangements and forms of rationality, might have seen the psychoanalytic consulting room as a new institutional setup that constituted a novel form of rationality and practice.
- 72 See Jean François Lyotard, “The Dream-Work Does Not Think,” in Andrew Benjamin, ed., *The Lyotard Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1989), 19ff.
- 73 See André Green, “Passions and Their Vicissitudes,” in *On Private Madness* (Madison, Conn: International Universities Press, 1986), 214–252.
- 74 See Joel Whitebook, “Slow Magic: Psychoanalysis and the Disenchantment of the World,” *The Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 50 (Winter 2002): 1197–1218.
- 75 Green, “Passions and Their Vicissitudes,” 244–245. This is to be distinguished from the Kleinian notion of a psychotic core.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 223.
- 77 See Marcel Gauchet and Gladys Swain, *Madness and Democracy: The Modern Psychiatric Universe*, trans. Catherine Porter (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), chapter 7. Among other things this important book is meant to be a rebuttal of *Madness and Civilization*.
- 78 See Hannah Arendt, *Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World*, Melvin H. Hill, ed. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), 314.

- 79 Jonathan Lear conceptualizes psychopathology as an *idiopolis*. See Jonathan Lear, "An Interpretation of Transference," in *Open Minded* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 69.
- 80 Gauchet and Swain, *Madness and Democracy*, 190–191.
- 81 Forrester, "Foucault and the History of Psychoanalysis," 306, n. 48.
- 82 Sigmund Freud, "The Dynamics of Transference," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols., James Strachey et al., eds. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953–1974), vol. XII, pp. 106–107.
- 83 Heinrich Racker, "The Meanings and Uses of Countertransference," *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 26 (1957): 307–308.
- 84 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 373–380.
- 85 Michel Foucault et al., "The Confession of the Flesh," in Colin Gordin, ed., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 211–212.
- 86 *Ibid.*, 212.
- 87 Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 130.
- 88 *Ibid.*, 140–144.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 144.
- 90 *Ibid.*, chapter 2.
- 91 *Ibid.*, 17–20.
- 92 *Ibid.*, 48.
- 93 The only place where this peculiar argument has real bite is with regard to modern advertising as it developed in the twentieth century. There, in a process that has gone to mind-boggling extremes in our own day, power does indeed increasingly stimulate sexuality to serve its own purposes, namely, to sell its commodities.
- 94 Forrester, "Foucault and the History of Psychoanalysis," 306, n. 48. See also John Forrester, "Contracting the Disease of Love: Authority and Freedom in the Origins of Psychoanalysis," and "What the Psychoanalyst Does With Words: Austin, Lacan and the Speech Acts of Psychoanalysis," in: *The Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan and Derrida*.
- 95 Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 60
- 96 Miller, "Michel Foucault and Psychoanalysis," 59.
- 97 See Forrester, "Foucault and the History of Psychoanalysis," 299.
- 98 Thomas Laqueur observes that "under the influence of Foucault, various versions of deconstruction, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and post-structuralism generally," the biological body "threatens to disappear entirely." *Making Sex: Body Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 12.
- 99 Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 106.

- 100 Ibid., 105–106.  
101 Ibid., Part I.  
102 Ibid., 157.  
103 Ibid., 131.  
104 Ibid., 157.  
105 Michel Foucault, "Introduction," in *Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century French Hermaphrodite*, trans. Richard McDougall (New York: Pantheon, 1980), vii.  
106 Ibid., xiii.  
107 Dana Breen, "General Introduction," in Dana Breen, ed., *The Gender Conundrum* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1.  
108 Schnädelbach, "The Face in the Sand," 317.  
109 Peter Dews, *The Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (New York: Verso, 1987), 168.  
110 Jacques-Alain Miller, "Michel Foucault and Psychoanalysis," in *Michel Foucault Philosopher*, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), 63.

In this essay, I cash in on a promissory note, made in *Perversion and Utopia: A Study of Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1995), to take up the question of "the dialogue with unreason" as it relates to psychoanalysis. The current article draws on two earlier publications: Joel Whitebook, "Freud, Foucault and 'The Dialogue with Unreason'," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 25:6 (1999): 29–66, and Joel Whitebook, "Michel Foucault: A Marcusean in Structuralist Clothing," *Thesis Eleven* 1 (November 2002): 52–70.