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Philosophy
Does "Madness" Belong in Philosophy?
Upcoming conferences challenge the divide between madness and philosophy.
Posted September 16, 2024 Reviewed by Michelle Quirk
Key points
- We often think of mental illness as impairing our perception of reality, rather than enhancing it.
- Two upcoming conferences address the important role of “madness” in philosophy.
- These conferences challenge the view that madness has no role in the pursuit of truth and knowledge.
The Great Divorce
A long-standing idea in psychiatry is that many of the mental illnesses that plague us involve the mind’s failure to make contact with the world fully.
I'm not just talking about those conditions marked by hallucinations—seeing things that aren’t there—or delusions—forming strange beliefs that don’t correspond to reality. Schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and others can involve such extreme symptoms.
To a lesser extent, conditions like depression, panic disorder, and personality disorders can be seen as impairing our ability to understand the world objectively. Depression, we’re told, involves feeling low for no good reason. Panic attacks involve feeling threatened over nothing. Personality disorders like BPD involve misreading the intentions of others.
For this reason, it makes sense that philosophy has traditionally excluded experiences of “madness”—at least in the Western world, since the Scientific Revolution of the 1600s. After all, what else is philosophy but the attempt to use reason and common sense to better understand the nature of reality? If “madness” is the loss of contact with reality, it would seem to have no place in the pursuit of truth and knowledge.
For the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), it seemed obvious that madness didn’t belong in philosophy. It wasn’t that mad people had different, and perhaps valuable, ways of thinking about the world. The mad, devoid of reason and sense, were not worth listening to.
Similarly, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) held that all forms of madness were, by definition, breakdowns in our ability to reason. They weren't unique and potentially valid forms of reasoning in their own right.
Putting Madness Back Into Philosophy
Two academic conferences this fall challenge the assumption that madness has nothing to teach philosophy.
What if madness, far from being a break with reality, is actually a distinctive way of experiencing reality? What if madness, far from being a failure of reason, is a unique and valid form of reasoning? What if madness can bring us closer to truth and knowledge?
The first conference, “From Philosophy of m/Madness to m/Mad Philosophy,” will take place at the University of Oxford on September 25th and 26th. Philosophers and other academics will explore questions like these: Can madness be a political identity? What is the connection between madness and spirituality? What is the line between delusion and insight?
The second conference, “Too Mad to Be True: The Paradoxes of Madness,” will take place at the Dr. Guislain Museum in Ghent, Belgium, on October 30th and 31st. It will explore a range of themes, including the role of madness in art, the nature of delusions, and the way that phenomenology can improve psychiatry.
Information about attending can be found on the conference websites.
These two conferences signal a renaissance in our thinking about madness and philosophy. Perhaps they will help bring current philosophy closer to the ancient Greek view, one held by Plato and his followers, that madness could be a form of insight that deserves to be respected and listened to.
“Madness” or “Mental Illness”?
Many of the speakers will reflect on their own experiences of madness. Others are sympathetic allies who share their mission to expand the current consensus about what counts as philosophy.
One might wonder why both conferences use the term “madness” rather than “mental illness.” Isn't “madness” an old-fashioned and derogatory term for people with serious mental illnesses?
According to this community of scholars and activists, the term “mad” isn’t always pejorative. Rather, it's a matter of reclaiming an identity, as in the “Mad pride” movement or “mad activism.”
For many mad activists, the problem with the term “mental illness” (or “mental disorder”) is that it embraces a narrowly medical worldview. It assumes that madness is a medical problem, the kind of thing that doctors are supposed to treat.
That assumption undermines the idea that experiences of madness can represent unconventional forms of perception or reasoning with their own value and insight.
None of this is to “romanticize” madness. Experiences of madness can be extremely distressing or disabling. But we can’t ignore the other side of the equation: that those experiences can also bring joy, pleasure, and powerful realizations.
Part of the goal of these conferences is to help bring about a cultural shift that gives all of us a wider range of frameworks for making sense of mad experiences.
