Equalitarianism

This is a slightly edited excerpt from this paper Nathan Honeycutt and I recently submitted for publication.

Hanging out with my Neanderthal bud

Source: Tim Skellett

A soon-to-be-published paper (Clark and Winegard, in press) reviewed some of the ways in which political biases undermine the validity and credibility of social science research. Their review concludes that political bias most often manifests as theories the field has advanced that flatter liberals and disparage conservatives, as ideologically motivated skepticism against theories and data that challenge liberal positions, and as the overrepresentation of liberals in social psychology.

Political bias has also emerged in the review of ideologically charged scientific articles, in exaggerating the impact of effects favorable to liberal positions, in ignoring plausible alternative hypotheses, in how some findings are framed and described, and in how findings are discussed. They argued that these problems are particularly acute when scientific findings (and sometimes, even questions) threaten researchers’ sacred values.

They further argue that the most sacred value for many social scientists is equalitarianism, by which they refer to a complex of interrelated ideas:

1. There are no biological differences between groups on socially valued traits (and, especially, no genetic differences).
2. Prejudice and discrimination are the only sources of group differences (and anyone who says otherwise is bigoted).
3. Society has a moral obligation to arrange itself so that all groups are equal on socially valued outcomes.

Source: Lee Jussim

Although their analysis has merit, we also think it does not go far enough, especially with respect to points one and three. Equalitarianism can, in our view, trigger scientific biases even when claims do not involve biology. For example, arguing that cultural or religious differences between groups produce unequal outcomes can also trigger equalitarian defensiveness, accusations of bigotry, and biased science.

When Amy Wax argued, for instance, that differences in the adoption of “bourgeois values” explain many of the outcome differences between blacks and whites in the U.S., the outraged response was immediate and swift (see this essay that reviews the responses and defends her view). Our point is not that Wax was correct; it is that she made no biological arguments at all. This is a real-world case in which something other than an attribution to discrimination for group differences on socially valued traits produced the full-blown outrage predicted by Clark and Winegard’s perspective.

Why? After decades of being inculcated with the evils of “blaming the victim,” any explanation for group differences other than discrimination—whether or not biological—is enough to trigger equalitarian outrage among some scientists. I also note that simply presenting evidence of the accuracy of stereotypes (without any presumption or evidence bearing on why groups differ) has also produced similar reactions.

We also think their point three is too restrictive. Sacred equalitarianism may even be a bit of a misnomer. In the extreme, this may go beyond a demand for absolute equality among groups and overflow into a motivation to “turn the tables” (to compensate for past wrongs by placing formerly marginalized groups not on an equal footing, but on a superior one).

For example, samples that skew politically left have recently been found to consider companies insufficiently racially diverse unless they have at least 25 to 32 percent black representation. Because black people only make up about 13 percent of the U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018), this could plausibly be viewed as a "turn the tables" implicit endorsement of discrimination against other groups.

My lab, 2019. Most members are women

Source: Lee Jussim

Similarly, much—in our view, most—of the discourse about sexist bias in education, academia, STEM, and even psychology emphasizes the difficulties women face (see this paper for a long list of references supporting this statement). Nonetheless, women now represent a majority of social psychologists, most of the leadership in at least one of the main social psychology professional organizations, a majority of psychologists, and have been more likely to complete high school, college, and graduate degrees than have men for about 40 years. If absolute equality was the only driver of motivated bias, one would be witnessing a dramatic upsurge in claims emphasizing biases against and obstacles to the success and representation of boys and men, given that inequality in these areas now favors women. That so much of the social science effort focuses on biases against women, and so little on those against men—even after women have largely surpassed men in many of these areas—is plausibly interpretable as indicating that, for some scholars, it is not equality per se that is held sacred, and the goal is, instead, to "turn the tables."