Skip to main content

Verified by Psychology Today

False Memories

How Vulnerable Are You to Believing Fake News?

Truth perceptions vary depending on motives, culture, and your existing beliefs.

Key points

  • Many people embrace misinformation because they fear uncertainty, need to bond with others, and perceive false information as gratifying.
  • Sources matter and unknown sources lead to greater vulnerability to misinformation.
  • Those who believe false information are usually highly confident in their beliefs.
 Gerd Altmann/Pixabay
Source: Gerd Altmann/Pixabay

Harboring false beliefs can be downright dangerous. Belief in misinformation is related to feelings of loneliness, depression, and stress (De Coninck et al., 2021). Individuals who embrace fake news often have feelings of anxiety, uncertainty, and powerlessness that dominate their thinking (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013). Pragmatically, falling for false health information can land you in the ICU on a respirator like many individuals who refused COVID-19 vaccinations. Considering the pervasive and far-reaching impact of false beliefs, it is important to know how these beliefs develop and what factors people consider when contemplating fact vs. fiction.

There are many reasons why people embrace false beliefs. The most frequent explanation suggests that we have a need to connect with other like-minded individuals. Bonding over false information is one way to make a connection. “Conspiracy theories valorize the self and the in-group by allowing blame for negative outcomes to be attributed to others” (Douglas et al., 2017, p. 540). In other words, our self-reflections prosper when we feel superior to other individuals and groups, and, in turn, the self-affirmations help us to feel more positive about who we are and what we value (Cichocka et al.; Zavala, 2016).

When trying to understand the escalated frequency of why people believe false information, we must consider situational factors such as the pandemic of 2020–2022. Not surprisingly, many of us have suffered from lack of human contact and have sought ways to fill the socialization gap. The lack of mental stimulation and limited recreational opportunities made false information seem more interesting and entertaining, captivating individuals who missed the drama typical of their pre-pandemic lives. In essence, sharing outrageous information provides emotional fulfillment that may be missing in other aspects of our lives (van Prooijen et al., 2022). Plenty of other reasons exist for the prevalence of false beliefs including the ability to feel like one is in control (Stojanov et al., 2020), how much analytical skill we have and our willingness to use it (Pennycook & Rand, 2019), and how substantial our need is to feel “correct” when accurately explaining the ambiguous world (Douglas et al., 2017).

The Role of Content in False Beliefs

Sure, most people recognize that sources of news and information have become much more polarized than ever. As such, we are drawn toward information that supports our beliefs and tend to avoid content (and people) that doesn't align with our own views. Thus, the dilemma of determining the truth behind news becomes increasingly problematic as it is difficult to decipher opinion from fact when people deliberately seek out information sources that confirm what they already believe. For example, Iyengar and Hahn (2009) presented newsfeed items as coming from Fox News, NPR, CNN, or BBC and had participants select which of four news items on a screen they would like to read. It was no surprise that partisan beliefs were instrumental in determining not only which content was read but also what we believed and what was remembered.

There are mixed results when it comes to the power of embracing a message versus rejecting one that conflicts with one’s beliefs. In other words, which information we choose to read and which information we reject is influenced by different factors (Mukerjee & Yang, 2021). Avoiding out-party information takes precedent over sharing and discussing one’s beliefs. Overall, when it comes to source evaluation, we tend to scrutinize disagreeable content more critically, while easily accepting information from sources that align with our views (Taber & Lodge, 2006). It's no surprise that the amount of attention we give to content that aligns with our beliefs is greater than what we give to information inconsistent with our preexisting attitudes (Westerwick et al., 2017).

The Source Matters More Than the Content

We evaluate the credibility of information based on perceived source expertise. Conversely, we tend to discount news from those who we believe are uninformed, misinformed, and biased in ways different from ourselves. In day-to-day practice, we are more willing to accept false or misleading messages from sources and people that we know and respect. As researchers Kim and Dennis explained, “When we talk with people, we consider who they are before we think about what they say. We use our prior knowledge of the source when we consider a story, and our knowledge of the source shapes how we evaluate the content that follows” (2019, p. 1027). If we think that someone is honest or has a reputation as being a sensible individual, we scrutinize the message far less than we would information from unknown sources, even when those unfamiliar sources may have strong public credibility.

Add social media to the problem and we have even more issues. Perhaps you resemble one of the 4.5-million Twitter contributors who are 70 percent more likely to spread fake news on social media than communicate truth (Vosoughi et al., 2018). The motive for sharing is often not content-related but to align with like-minded people who will empathize and support your position regardless of accuracy. The vaccine-efficacy debate is a testament to dissemination as most people don’t scrutinize scientific information when sharing but instead focus on supporting people with similar views, while denouncing those whose ideas and behaviors do not align with personal philosophy.

The Damaging Role of Confidence

Sources really matter when we attempt to evaluate the accuracy of information, but none more so than when we are the architect of the knowledge we intend to share. In practical terms, this means we make implicit assessments concerning how confident we are in our own beliefs and knowledge. The greater our degree of confidence, the more likely we are to share information, correct or not. Individuals who proclaim themselves “experts” on a topic also tend to judge fake news to be highly accurate (Pennycook & Rand, 2019) resulting in more frequent sharing of the false information.

Finally, we must consider the “illusory truth effect.” The premise of the effect suggests that repetition alone implies truth, even when we know the information is false. Fazio et al. (2016) conducted a series of studies in which individuals were given false information about the world’s oceans. Despite participants' pre-existing knowledge, individuals who had repeated exposure to the same false message were willing to evaluate the false information as true. The researchers concluded that inferring truth from repetition takes advantage of our tendency to be lazy thinkers. In other words, why bother to draw upon our background knowledge and reason through truth and accuracy when we can just endorse what we have repeatedly heard? This is a bad practice, but one that can easily be avoided with a little contemplation and awareness.

References

Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., & Golec de Zavala, A. (2016). Does self-love or self-hate predict conspiracy beliefs? Narcissism, self-esteem, and the endorsement of conspiracy theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(2), 157–166.

De Coninck, D., Frissen, T., Matthijs, K., d’Haenens, L., Lits, G., Champagne-Poirier, O., ... & Généreux, M. (2021). Beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation about COVID-19: Comparative perspectives on the role of anxiety, depression and exposure to and trust in information sources. Frontiers in Psychology, 12.

Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 538–542. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417718261

Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., & Marsh, E. J. (2015). Knowledge does not protect against illusory truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(5), 993–1002.

Grzesiak-Feldman, M. (2013). The effect of high-anxiety situations on conspiracy thinking. Current Psychology, 32(1), 100–118.

Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39.

Kim, A., & Dennis, A. R. (2019). Says who? The effects of presentation format and source rating on fake news in social media. MIS Quarterly, 43(3): 1025–1039.

Mukerjee, S., & Yang, T. (2021). Choosing to Avoid? A conjoint experimental study to understand selective exposure and avoidance on social media. Political Communication, 38(3), 222–240.

Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Fighting misinformation on social media using crowdsourced judgments of news source quality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(7), 2521–2526.

Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition, 188, 39–50.

Taber, C. S., & Lodge M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 755–769. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x

Stojanov, A., Bering, J. M., & Halberstadt, J. (2020). Does perceived lack of control lead to conspiracy theory beliefs? Findings from an online MTurk sample. PloS One, 15(8), e0237771.

Westerwick, A., Johnson, B. K., & Knobloch-Westerwick, S. (2017). Confirmation biases in selective exposure to political online information: Source bias vs. content bias. Communication Monographs, 84(3), 343–364.

van Prooijen, J. W., Ligthart, J., Rosema, S., & Xu, Y. (2022). The entertainment value of conspiracy theories. British Journal of Psychology, 113(1), 25–48.

advertisement
More from Bobby Hoffman Ph.D.
More from Psychology Today
More from Bobby Hoffman Ph.D.
More from Psychology Today