Verified by Psychology Today

Edouard Machery

About

Edouard Machery, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh as well as a resident fellow of the Center for Philosophy of Science (University of Pittsburgh) and a member of the Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition (Carnegie Mellon University and University of Pittsburgh). His research focuses on the philosophical issues raised by the cognitive sciences. He has published on a wide range of topics in the philosophy of psychology, including the nature of concepts, racial cognition, evolutionary psychology, innateness, and moral psychology. He is the author of Doing without Concepts, forthcoming at Oxford University Press. He is also one of the leading contributors to the development of experimental philosophy.

Books by Edouard Machery
Recent Posts
How to Eliminate Racism Part I

No doubt, racism is one of the most important evils in our pluralistic, open societies need to confront. And various programs are meant to do so. But what are the odds that these programs will work? Psychology can help us answer this question.

No doubt, racism is one of the most important evils in our pluralistic, open societies need to confront. And various programs are meant to do so. But what are the odds that these programs will work? Psychology can help us answer this question.

Know thyself?

Knowledge about our own mental states seems to be the most secure thing in the world, doesn’t it? I certainly know what I feel and think right now and I know it more securely than any other thing I might know. Right? Philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel begs to differ.

Knowledge about our own mental states seems to be the most secure thing in the world, doesn’t it? I certainly know what I feel and think right now and I know it more securely than any other thing I might know. Right? Philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel begs to differ.

What's Innate and What's Not? And Should We Care?

Philosophers and psychologists often debate about whether our beliefs, emotions, desires, values, etc., are innate or whether they are learned. But does this type of debate make sense? Paul Griffiths, Stefan Linquist and I have argued that it does not!

Philosophers and psychologists often debate about whether our beliefs, emotions, desires, values, etc., are innate or whether they are learned. But does this type of debate make sense? Paul Griffiths, Stefan Linquist and I have argued that it does not!