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Be quiet. You are making me uncomfortable. ~ The Book of Harm
Many of us cherish the ideal of open communication, the forthright exchange of ideas, thoughts, and feelings. This ideal dates back to the Enlightenment, a time when men and women were thought to be basically rational and capable of moral sentiment. The dual capacity for rationality and morality implies a lack of defensiveness (rationality) and trickery or manipulation (morality). Under conditions of open communication, a community can thrive and reach consensus while still tolerating dissent and alternate perspectives. At the now quaint-sounding limit, open inquiry and communication gravitates towards, approximates, and then reaches Truth.
Were it only so! Humans are only boundedly rational and conditionally moral. Beliefs in the silly (magnet therapy) and the outrageous (no holocaust) remain alive and consensus on basic moral values a utopia. This, I’m afraid, we will have to accept. There will be ineradicable diversity of opinion even on issues that you would think science and other scholarship have settled.
What is more difficult to accept is the manipulation of the process of open communication itself. To shut down channels of communication is a dangerous game to play. Let us ask: How does it happen and what are the consequences?
Rationality can serve to limit communication. The basic strategy is intimidation. Consider Ida and Jon, two players in a communication game. Ida and Jon have a close relationship, which neither wants to see fail. Now, Ida has developed all manner of fancy notions about magnetic therapy and loves to expound. Jon counters with studies failing to find an effect of such therapy. Ida holds firms, digs in, and becomes ever more convinced of the magic of magnetism. The relationship suffers. Jon decides to ‘let it go’ to keep the peace. Ida predicted this would happen and cheerfully pursues her magnetic interests.. How did Ida make this prediction? She knew that her interaction with Jon had the form of a game of chicken (Rapoport & Chammah, 1966), in which she made the first move and then refused to back down. This left Jon with a choice between his worst outcome (leaving Ida) and his second worst outcome (caving). Jon could not get the first-move advantage on his side; it violates conversational logic to begin a conversation with ordinary claims or claims regarding there being nothing (Grice, 1975). Such claims are by nature reactive. Having lost first-move advantage, Jon would have to argue even more forcefully and extravagantly than Ida did if there were to be any hope that she might back down. This, however, is a low-probability prospect, and Jon may reasonably think that the invalidity of magnetic therapy is not a hill worth dying on.
What if Ida went on to expound on the non-existence of the holocaust? This would be as interesting as it is disturbing. Denying the holocaust is a negative claim, which we know is difficult to make assertively. Let us then reframe this scenario: Suppose Ida claims that all of us have been lied to by the media and the cabal behind them. This is a positive claim in the sense that it is about something happening rather than not happening. Again, Jon counter-argues to a stalemate—though with positive (not nothing) evidence this time (evidence demonstrating that there was a holocaust). With Ida being unmoved, Jon faces a choice between giving up and walking away. We don’t know what he will do. It depends on the strength of his personal convictions and the punishment (negative payoffs in the game of chicken) he is willing to endure. And this is the second aspect of the manipulative communication game: It can destroy interpersonal relations and community cohesion.
Moving from the interpersonal level pitting Jon against Ida, consider a social group or community and its formal and informal norms of what may and may not be said. The existence of certain ‘thou shalt not say x’ norms surrenders the Enlightenment ideal of openness. Whereas the Enlightenment trusted people to be rational and moral, a restrictive normative environment does not. Social norms limiting speech take away speakers’ and writers’ rights. A curtailment of rights requires a justification lest it be dictatorial. A popular justification is that certain types of speech are offensive and that the harm done is greater than the harm of losing the freedom of expression and the freedom of hearing such expression. How are these two types of harm assessed and weighted against each other? An Enlightenment idealist would look for a way to measure each type of harm, compare the results, and then make a rational decision. But such an expectation seems unrealistic. Lacking evidence, harm itself becomes a matter of communication and assertion, and we are back to the game of chicken. A not atypical sequence of events runs like this (compare a recent brouhaha at a Brown University daily paper): An opinion provokes accusations of bad faith and harm-doing. There are also claims of the opinion being factually false, but mostly without elaboration or evidence. The assertions of harm are based broadly; they are immediate, emotional, and demanding of restitution. A response might have three parts: point to the harm to the author of the opinion, point to the harm of the publisher's autonomy, and point to the harm to the general audience and its right of free access to opinion. The incentives for backing down are considerable. Peace is restored for the moment, but open communication has been the casualty.
I expect that some will disagree with my analysis and conclusions, and I am happy to consider any critical rejoinder. If this essay is perceived as biased, I hope that objections will rise above the level of assertion. I might even change my opinion, but I request—as per my idealistic Enlightenment mindset—good arguments.
Grice, P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts (pp. 41-58). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1966). The game of chicken. American Behavioral Scientist, 10, 10-28.
