Parenting
Licensing Parents?
Analyzing a proposal for reducing child abuse and neglect.
Posted December 28, 2020 Reviewed by Matt Huston
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In February of 2004, Joseph Dowler was sentenced in Boulder Colorado District Court to 60 years in prison for child abuse leading to the death of his infant son, Tanner Dowler. In his nine weeks of life, Tanner suffered horrific injuries: 11 broken ribs, fractures in every limb, and oxygen deprivation that led to severe brain damage. The judge in the case noted that all of these injuries could have been produced by shaking, but the second-degree burns that Tanner suffered on the soles of his feet could only be the result of torture. At the sentencing hearing, Boulder District Attorney Mary Keenan read a statement from Tanner’s perspective, saying "I will never get my first tooth, sit up alone, crawl, or take my first step. I will never get to learn that neglect and rejection and fear and pain are not the way other people live their lives."
This case is but one example of the terrible treatment that children receive from people who are not qualified to be parents. Hugh LaFollette’s defense of the claim that the state should license parents is arguably the most influential and widely discussed version of the philosophical argument in favor of licensing parents. LaFollette argues that if an activity is potentially harmful to others and requires a certain level of competence that can be demonstrated via a reliable test, then it should be regulated by the state. For example, we require that physicians obtain medical licenses from the state to ensure their competency due to the potential harm caused by medical malpractice. In order to drive an automobile, a level of skill must be demonstrated because of the potential harm to others that can be done by incompetent drivers. Critical to this argument in favor of licensing parents is that (as with other activities for which we require licenses) parenting is potentially harmful and requires competence that can be demonstrated via a reliable test. LaFollette proposes formulating a test that is narrowly focused on predicting parental incompetence, looking for factors that point to a tendency toward abuse or neglect as a way of determining who would likely be a bad parent.
Parents can harm their children through abuse, neglect, and lack of love. This often results in physical and psychological damage. In turn, children who suffer in these ways may become adults who are neither well-adjusted nor happy, which can lead to cyclical patterns of abuse. It is also true that many people lack the competency required to parent children in an adequate way, due to factors such as an unsuitable temperament, a lack of knowledge or energy, and psychological/emotional instability. If the state required parental licenses, then those who lack the competency required to be a parent and would therefore be likely to harm their children in serious ways would be prevented from doing so. Those who fail to obtain a parental license and yet bear a child would face having that child removed from the home and given to qualified adoptive parents. Alternatively, LaFollette suggests that "a system of tax incentives for licensed parents, and protective services scrutiny of nonlicensed parents, might adequately protect children." If so, he would endorse these less drastic measures. However, if these measures were not sufficiently effective, LaFollette argues that children should be removed from the custody of unlicensed parents.
If we deny that parental licensing is justified, then, by parity of reasoning, we might have no justification for requiring physicians or automobile drivers to be licensed, given that we have licensing for doctors and drivers because the relevant actions are potentially harmful and require a level of demonstrable competence. Moreover, we screen adoptive parents, and require that they demonstrate a level of competence before they are allowed to adopt a child. And it is important to point out that, on reflection, we think that requiring some sort of screening for potential adoptive parents is a good thing, because it reduces the chance that adopted children will be neglected or abused. LaFollette concludes that since a state program for licensing parents is desirable, justifiable, and feasible, we should implement such a program.
Legally mandated family monitoring and counseling, however, may be preferable to parental licensing—and a test similar to that proposed by LaFollette could be employed. For those who fail this test, close monitoring of the well-being of the child and of the general character of the family would be justified. In these types of situations, psychological and family counseling could be mandated by law, so that parents who fall under this category have the opportunity to deal with their liabilities as parents, as well as demonstrate in good faith that they value the well-being of their children. If such parents fail to undergo counseling, or fail to deal with their liabilities in a satisfactory manner, or the level of risk to the child is serious enough, then removal of the child from their custody would be justified.
Compared to a program of licensing parents, legally mandated family monitoring and counseling does a better job of taking into account the interests people have in becoming and being parents and continues to place a high value on the protection, interests, and well-being of children. A program of monitoring and counseling also better avoids the possible injustices that may occur given the fallibility of any test aimed at predicting human behavior, and would give some parents who are predicted to fail a chance to succeed and prove the prediction wrong. This is important because many people who would seemingly be incompetent parents rise to the occasion once they have the actual responsibility of raising a child. People can change, and it is better to give them the opportunity to do so under close supervision, monitoring, and counseling, allowing them to be with their children when they are young and so much bonding occurs. Such a practice would protect the interests of children, society, and parents. For those parents whose incompetence is severe or who fail to deal with their incompetence in a satisfactory manner, the monitoring/counseling proposal prevents them from raising children.
It must be emphasized that our current policies in the United States related to family life are inconsistent with the value that we claim to place on the well-being of children, and they allow too much suffering in the lives of children and parents, as the case of Tanner Dowler makes plain. A laissez-faire approach with respect to who is allowed to raise children that allows so much suffering to occur is unjust. As a solution, when such measures are appropriate, we should engage in close family monitoring and legally mandated family counseling before abuse and neglect occur, whenever this is possible.
References
Hugh LaFollette, "Licensing Parents," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 182–197.
Michael W. Austin, Conceptions of Parenthood (Routledge, 2007).