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President Donald Trump

Moving the Immigration Conversation Forward

How can we have an inclusive conversation?

Key points

  • Moving the national immigration conversation forward requires including conservatives in the conversation.
  • Conservatives' opposition is often based in perceptions of threat and attempts to defend against those threats.
  • Conservatives will be most likely to soften their opposition to immigration if they are gently helped to see the irrationality of their fears.

It is well known that conservatives are generally opposed to undocumented immigration (Stupi et al., 2016), and that some are in favor of restricting legal immigration as well. Social-psychological research suggests that political conservatism is linked with greater perceptions of realistic and symbolic threats (Rios et al., 2018). The Trump administration's stance on undocumented migration typifies many conservative groups' positions: The focus was placed on strictly enforcing U.S. border policies and on deporting individuals who were not lawfully present, even if they had been residing in the country for years and had formed families (Woods & Arthur, 2017). "Zero tolerance" policies were implemented, including separating children from their parents at the border, forcing asylum seekers to wait in potentially dangerous Mexican border cities until their cases were heard, and banning nearly all migration from Muslim-majority countries whose governments were unwilling or unable to provide information on their citizens who wished to enter the United States.

A common view among left-leaning circles, including academia generally and the immigration research community specifically, was that Trump was a racist xenophobe whose views were dangerous to marginalized people simply looking for a better life. A common theme was that anyone who supported Trump, or sympathized with his views, should be censored on social media, prevented from speaking on university campuses, and ideally banned from polite society.

I teach a class on the psychology of immigration and cultural adaptation at the University of Texas at Austin. Only a few blocks from our campus, Governor Greg Abbott is attempting to build a wall on the Texas-Mexico border, mobilize the Texas National Guard to arrest unauthorized border crossers, and transport undocumented migrants to northern cities. The governor's official statement says that "Texas will continue sending migrants to sanctuary cities like Washington, D.C. until President Biden and Border Czar Harris step up and do their jobs to secure the border." I told my students that, as long as we marginalize conservatives from our conversations about immigration, they will continue to work against efforts to support migrants in their quests for a better life in the United States. Paradoxically, if we want to “turn down the temperature” in terms of political discourse on immigration, we need to include conservatives in the conversation rather than excluding them. Trying to silence and marginalize them will only lead them to dig their heels in and try even harder to limit types of immigration with which they disagree or that they find threatening.

But wait, I can imagine many readers thinking: How can we include people in the conversation who hold such abhorrent and harmful views?

As I tell my students, the answer lies in trying to understand where conservatives are coming from. Many of their anti-immigration views are based in perceptions of threat that can be addressed and, hopefully, toned down. As Stephan and Stephan (2000) note in their integrated threat theory, most threat perceptions are exaggerated and are based on distorted views of reality. The fear that Spanish speakers will take over the United States (Huntington, 2004) is just that – an irrational fear based on experiences of walking into supermarkets or other places of business and hearing Spanish being widely spoken. This irrational fear does not take into account the research finding that most Hispanic youth tend to be proficient English speakers even if they are raised in extremely ethnically dense areas (Portes & Rumbaut, 2014). However, because perceptions – and not objective reality – drive one’s reactions and behavior, people who view immigrants (or some subset of immigrants) as a threat will act upon that perception, even if the perception is inaccurate.

Social-psychological theories (e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2006) specify that, when individuals or groups perceive threats, they will generally mount a defense against it. In the case of immigration, host nationals (native-born people from native-born families) who feel threatened by immigrants may favor restrictionist immigration policies, including mass deportations, as a way of “defending” the nation against those perceived threats (Finley & Esposito, 2020). As a result, many of Trump’s immigration policies were based in social-psychological threat and defense dynamics. Undocumented immigration – in addition to some legal immigration and other entry processes such as the H1b visa – was cast as an existential threat. From Trump’s (2016) perspective, undocumented immigrants were taking advantage of the United States – and Patrick Buchanan (2011) claimed that Mexico was clandestinely sending undocumented migrants to reclaim from the U.S. territory that Mexico lost in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1838. Both of these claims are easily falsifiable, as Chavez (2013) has demonstrated.

Our role as immigration scholars, and as academicians more broadly, is not to silence and shame the voices making these claims. Rather, our role is to engage with them and convince them otherwise. Such a strategy is unlikely to be effective with every anti-immigration conservative, but it may well work with some, or even most. Although critics have labeled Trump as a fringe conspiracy theorist, 75 million people voted for him in the 2020 election. This number alone is evidence enough to rule out the possibility that half of the voting public can somehow be left out of the decision and policy-making process. Indeed, our task is far more daunting: Help these people to see that their fears are unfounded and that their opposition to expanded immigration is not necessary, and is indeed not in the country’s best interests. With the Baby Boom generation continuing to retire in large numbers, we need immigrants to replenish the U.S. workforce (Myers, 2008).

However, at the same time, those of us with more progressive immigration stances must also examine our beliefs and reasonableness of those beliefs. Much of the literature on undocumented immigration, such as the “legal violence” perspective (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012), carries the implicit assumption that all undocumented immigrants should be allowed to enter and stay in the United States – and that not allowing them to do so represents an act of violence. A 2021 Gallup poll (Clifton, 2021) found that 42 million Latin American people would want to live in the United States if they could. Can the U.S. absorb that many people – or even a fraction of that number? Of course, this number only reflects Latin America, and not the other regions that have been represented among people crossing the border since Joe Biden took office. Some key questions need to be asked in a national conversation involving people from both sides of the political spectrum: Who should be allowed to enter the United States, who should not, and why? Which undocumented people already residing in the U.S. (if any) should be deported, which should not, and why? Are there any conditions that would render someone inadmissible or deportable? If so, what are those conditions? Are the numbers of people crossing the border without authorization sustainable in the long term? If not, what should be done to decrease those numbers?

So the arguments I am advancing suggest that addressing issues around immigration are far more complex than simply celebrating liberals and demonizing conservatives. We must invite conservatives into the conversation so that they will decrease their opposition to large-scale immigration. Just as rational-emotive therapy models encourage clients to challenge irrational beliefs and fears, we must help our fellow citizens do likewise. Marginalizing and shaming them will only lead them to harden their opposition, which will make our task much more difficult—if not impossible; the U.S. Congress has not passed comprehensive immigration legislation since 1986. Inviting people on the right side of the political spectrum into the conversation will not be easy or comfortable, but it is a necessary step if we are to move forward in our quest to support immigrants in the long term.

Perhaps even more dauntingly, we must also subject our own beliefs about immigration to critical scrutiny. Are our theoretical and philosophical approaches assuming that everyone who wants to enter the United States should be allowed in? If our answer is yes, is such an assumption reasonable or possible? Would doing so strain the country’s resources beyond what they can support? And if our answer is no, how would we decide who should be allowed in (or allowed to stay) and who should not?

This is a difficult challenge for us as academics, immigration researchers, and members of the U.S. community, but it is a challenge we must take on.

References

Buchanan, P. J. (2011). Suicide of a superpower: Will America survive until 2025? New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Chavez, L. J. (2013). The Latino threat. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clifton, J. (2021, March 24). 42 million want to migrate to the U.S. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/opinion/chairman/341678/million-migrate.aspx.

Finley, L., & Esposito, L. (2020). The immigrant as bogeyman: Examining Donald Trump and the right’s anti-immigrant, anti-PC rhetoric. Humanity and Society, 44, 178-197.

Huntington, S. P. (2004). Who are we? The challenge to America’s national identity. New York: Penguin.

Menjívar, C., & Abrego, L. (2012). Legal violence: Immigration law and the lives of Central American immigrants. American Journal of Sociology, 117, 1380-1421.

Myers, D. (2008). Immigrants and boomers. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2014). Immigrant America: A portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rios, K., Sosa, N., & Osborn, H. (2018). An experimental approach to Intergroup Threat Theory: Manipulations, moderators, and consequences of realistic vs. symbolic threat. European Review of Social Psychology, 29, 212-255.

Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 183-242.

Stephan, W. G., Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.) Reducing prejudice and discrimination (pp. 23-45). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Stupi, E., Chiricos, T., & Gertz, M. (2016). Perceived criminal threat from undocumented immigrants: Antecedents and consequences for policy preferences. Justice Quarterly, 33, 239-266.

Trump, D. J. (2016). Great again: How to fix our crippled America. New York: Threshold.

Woods, J., & Arthur, C. D. (2017). Debating immigration in the age of terrorism, polarization, and Trump. Lexington Books.

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