When Disagreements Are Caused by Talking Past Each Other

What is talking past each other?

Imagine two people walking on a path through an unfamiliar forest discussing how they might cross a river up ahead. "Perhaps at the riverbank, there will be a ferry that can take us across the river," the first person says. "A fairy?" asks the second person incredulously. "What are you talking about? Fairies don't even exist!" Startled, the first person replies, "What are you talking about? There might not be a ferry where this path meets the river, but I am sure that there are ferries somewhere along the river."

When people think that they are talking about the same thing but are actually talking about different things, this is a form of "talking past each other" (see Glaser, 2012). This is known as the "jingle fallacy" in psychological assessment (Block, 1996). In this post, I examine how biologists Kevin Mitchell (2023) and Robert Sapolsky (2023) talk past each other about the existence of free will. (You can review my previous description of their disagreement here, and watch them debate the existence of free will in this YouTube video.)

In their books, both Mitchell and Sapolsky seem reluctant to begin with a clear and explicit definition of free will. Mitchell (2023, p. 278): "I purposely did not start with a preconceived notion of what properties our will must have to qualify as 'free,' for this purpose or any other." Sapolsky (2023, p. 14): "What is free will? Groan ... I'll do my best to mitigate the drag of this." [See also Fischer's (2023) analysis of Sapolsky's reluctance to define free will straightforwardly.]

Refusing to define what you are talking about is a recipe for talking past each other. An examination of the debate and their books shows that Mitchell may have argued about the existence of ferries, while Sapolosky may have argued about the nonexistence of fairies.

Kevin Mitchell's View of Free Will

After reviewing the evolution of life from single-celled organisms to human beings, Mitchell (2023) eventually arrives at a definition of free will as "conscious, rational control" (p. 20). Rather than review Mitchell's long account of this nearly 4-billion-year history, I'll describe the beginning and end of his account.

Mitchell notes that the first single-celled organisms probably made choices to move toward environments that were favorable to survival and away from environments that threatened survival, but these choices are not free because they were not caused by conscious deliberation. An amoeba's behaviors are immediate, automatic reactions based on the physical state of the external environment and the internal chemical state of the organism.

But as the nervous system evolved, animals with sufficiently complex brains did not have to react immediately and automatically to situations. Human brains can think about the relative importance of desired goals and behavioral options for achieving those goals, contemplate which behavioral options are most likely to achieve that highest-priority goal under the current circumstances, and consciously choose the best option. For Mitchell, the "free" in free will refers to our ability to take the time to contemplate and choose from a variety of imagined, possible options instead of reacting automatically like an amoeba. According to Mitchell, the fact that brains exhibit this kind of conscious, rational control demonstrates the existence of free will.

Robert Sapolsky's Definition of Free Will

In both his book and in the debate video, Sapolsky notes that most people talk about free will in terms of conscious intent. People say that a person exhibits free will if they (1) are conscious of their behavioral intent, (2) are aware of the likely outcome of the behavior, (3) are aware that there were other behavioral options and alternatives available to them, and (4) are not being coerced by other people. This description is nearly identical to Mitchell's description of conscious, rational choice.

But Sapolsky has an argument for why conscious, rational choice is not free.

Sapolsky points out that, for any intention, there will always be a multitude of previous events over which the person has no awareness or control and that these prior events collectively determine every conscious intent. These events include recent hormone and blood sugar levels, unconscious habits instilled by parents during childhood, drugs, alcohol, and stress hormones in the body of the person's mother during her pregnancy, inherited genetic influences, and ecological features that shaped human evolution. Sapolsky concludes that the will is never free because we are never fully free from the past that shaped who we are and what we intend to do.

Mitchell's Response to Sapolsky

When Sapolsky pointed out that past events always influence current decisions, Mitchell claimed that this was irrelevant to freedom. He responded that, in fact, it would be impossible to exercise free will if past events had zero influence on our choices, because then we would have nothing to base our choices on—no previously established goals, no acquired understanding of how the world works, no lessons from past experience. For Mitchell, the inevitability of past influences does not make the will unfree. For Sapolsky, the inevitability of past influences is exactly what makes the will unfree.

Free Will Essential Reads

Reclaim Your Existence in an Anti-Human World—I, Exist

Are We Captured by Our Genes or the Rulers of Our Destiny?

Consequences of Speaking Past Each Other About Free Will

In debates where people use different definitions and talk past each other, participants can become confused and frustrated and claim that the other person is contradicting themself. For example, science writer John Horgan (2023) defines free will exactly as Mitchell does: "Free will is your capacity to discern different possible paths; weigh their pros and cons; and choose one path because of your deliberations." Horgan then claims that Sapolsky's deliberations contradict his arguments against free will: "Sapolsky has weighed the arguments for and against free will and has concluded that it does not exist. Sapolsky’s anti-free-will book is thus a spectacular demonstration, and product, of Sapolsky’s own free will."

But Sapolsky does not define free will as drawing conclusions after deliberation. He defines it as the complete absence of past influences on decision-making. So, there is no contradiction; only frustrated confusion on the part of John Horgan.

In another example, Mitchell found himself agreeing with Sapolsky that people with mental illness, brain tumors, parasites, and addictions are not as competent to make good decisions as "normal" people. He therefore concedes that defective people have diminished free will, but then claims that Sapolsky contradicts himself by not accepting that normal people have free will. Sapolsky responded by asking what the difference is between a poorly functioning brain with a single obvious cause (like mental illness) and a poorly functioning brain shaped by a host of past influences (poor parenting, poverty, inadequate schooling)? Mitchell seemed able to imagine only obvious, profound past influences that reduce competence (and therefore freedom). But Sapolsky was claiming that past causes, both subtle and obvious, determine every single human behavior, both competent and incompetent. They talked right past each other.

So, the next time you find yourself disagreeing with someone, make sure that you are talking about the same thing.